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Abstract
The thesis consists of thee parts. Part one considers firm-union bargain over 
wages and working conditions (effort). It studies in a partial equilibrium setting, the 
theoretical relationship between the scope of firm-union bargains and the outcome in 
terms of wages, employment and effort. In particular, the outcome of a bargain over 
wages and effort is contrasted with the outcome of a pure wage bargain. A main result 
is that both effort and wages are lower when effort requirements are negotiable (rather 
than being determined by the employer). The analysis yields implications for the 
impact of unions on productivity, and gives an explanation to cross-industry
i
differences in union mark-up on wages.
In the second part I study labour contracts under temporarily asymmetric 
information. Under the assumption that workers are more heavily credit rationed than 
firms, the standard model of testing and self-selection in the labour market is extended 
in several directions. First, it is shown that ex post inefficient termination may be used 
as a self-selection device. This is a new explanation for up-or-out contracts in 
occupations where workers' productivity is revealed slowly. Second, when risk 
neutral workers can be of more than two different productivities, only the best worker 
should be overpaid. Finally, when productivity is non-verifiable, large firms may have 
an advantage in hiring more able workers.
The issue of discrimination in the labour market is adressed in the last part. A 
model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is 
shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no 
agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) 
earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter 
requirements in order to obtain work. The model also offers a new explanation for 
duration dependence in exit rates from unemployment.
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Introduction
The traditional theory of labour markets implies that a worker's wage should be 
equal to the value of his marginal product. However, this theory clearly fails to account 
for a number of important empirical phenomena. The awkward fact which has been of 
most concern to economists is that the theory cannot account for involuntary 
unemployment. But there are also other observations which have suggested the 
inadequacy of the theory, and it is some of these which motivate the research here.
First, the traditional theory, resting on the assumption that workers' behavior is 
atomistic, is obviously silent on the issue of trade unions. The analysis of unions, and 
their impact on wages, working conditions and employment, requires a different 
approach. In recent years, non-cooperative bargaining theory has been developed to a 
point where it can guide our thinking about wage negotiations. In formal models, it has 
been common to assume that bargaining occurs either over wages or wages and 
employment. Empirically, however, working conditions constitute an important aspect 
of such negotiations - much more so than does employment. The first chapter in the 
thesis considers this issue. There, I study how the outcome depends on the scope of 
the bargain. A main result is that both effort and wages are lower when effort 
requirements are negotiable, (rather than being determined by the employer). The 
model might explain the low union mark-up on wages in the public sector and also why 
the mark-up on wages differs significantly across industries. The analysis also casts 
some doubt on the traditional definition of union power as being the mark-up on the 
competitive wage. A strong union may well agree to low wages if working conditions 
are sufficiendy luxurious. Thus, the mark-up on wages may overstate or understate the 
returns to unionization when effort is taken in to consideration.
Another phenomenon for which the traditional theory offers no explanation is the 
fact that firms are concerned over the recruitment of workers. According to the 
traditional theory, an employer should be indifferent with respect to the skills of 
different workers, as differences in skill would merely be reflected in the wages. One
6
potential explanation is that information is not symmetric, i.e. the worker has 
information which the employer does not have. Then the employer have to make hiring 
decisions before he knows the exact abilities of the workers. However, it is easily 
shown that if workers are risk neutral, all contracts enforceable, and capital markets are 
perfect, the firm can simply defer the payment until productivity is revealed and pay 
accordingly, in which case the traditional conclusion applies; the employer is indifferent 
whom to hire. This was one of the basic insights of the early literature on self-selection 
in the labour market. Chapter 2 therefore explores the impact on hiring and firing 
policies when one or more of these assumptions do not hold. E.g., it is (realistically) 
assumed that workers' ability to lend money against future income is limited. Thus, 
wage payments cannot be costlessly postponed, and the use of other self-selection 
policies may therefore be justified. In particular, I identify conditions under which up- 
or-out contracts, i.e. terminations of productive relationships, are optimal. (It is 
noteworthy that, since self-selection is costly in this model, it could provide a rationale 
for careful selection of workers. Although this is not emphasized in the paper, it is 
obvious that pre-screening would reduce the need for self-selection. Furthermore, if 
application is costly to the worker, the pre-screening would also serve as a self­
selection device.) Another regularity at which the analysis may throw some light is the 
observation that large firms usually employ high productivity workers.
A third observation with which the traditional theory is incompatible is the 
prevalence of discrimination - the unequal treatment of (ex ante) identical groups of 
workers. Indeed, equal treatment of equals is among the most robust predictions of the 
standard marginalist analysis of market equilibrium, unaffected by e.g. the introduction 
of market power. Empirically, it is well established that black men earns less than 
white men and women less than men. Typically, the black/white wage ratio is around 
0.6 to 0.8. The same is true for the women/men wage ratio. The variance in estimates 
is mainly due to whether one includes variables such as education, experience and 
occupation. In chapter 3 ,1 have constructed a model of discrimination in the labour
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market. The model exhibits multiple equilibria, but only discriminating equilibria are 
stable. Like in chapter 2, asymmetric information plays an important role in generating 
this result. However, I also depart from the Walrasian framework by couching the 
analysis in a search and matching context. Briefly, the discrimination occurs because a 
discriminated group will apply for jobs in which they are less well matched, thus 
fulfilling the belief held by the employer that this group of worker has a lower expected 
productivity.
While the three chapters break with the traditional model of labour markets, they 
are all linked firmly to different strands of the "new orthodoxy" being developed over 
the last 30 years. The development of new analytical tools has allowed the analytical 
consideration of bargaining, contracting under incomplete information, and search. 
These are essential institutional features of the labour market, and it is not surprising 
that we can gain improved insight into the workings of the labour market when these 
features are explicitly incorporated into our analysis.
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Chapter 1: BARGAINING OVER EFFORT1
l.Introduction
In the theoretical literature on union behavior it is common to compare wages and 
employment in two bargaining situations. Either the union bargains with the firm over 
employment and wages, or the bargaining issue is wages only, and the firm decides 
employment (see e.g. Me Donald and Solow (1981) and the recent survey by Farber 
(1987)). In reality, however, bargains between unions and firms rarely involve 
employment directly (see e.g. Oswald (1987)). On the other hand, bargaining over 
such conditions as hours and work intensity (in our terminology effort) is widespread. 
Two questions immediately arising from this observation are, first, what determines the 
scope of firm-union contracts and, second, how does this scope influence the actual 
outcome, i.e. wages, effort, profits, employment etc.
Here I leave aside the challenging first question, just taking as my starting point 
that wages and effort are in fact the variables explicitly agreed upon by the two 
parties.2 The basic aim of the analysis is to study, within this more "realistic" 
framework, the relationship between wages, effort and employment levels. In 
particular I want to compare the outcome of effort bargaining with the outcome from 
having the firm set effort requirements unilaterally.
A problem associated with making such comparison is that it is not always 
reasonable to treat all bargaining variables symmetrically. The disagreement outcomes 
may be very different for effort compared to fiscal remuneration; e.g there may be a
 ^Valuable comments and suggestions have been received from James Albrecht, Tore Ellingsen,
Steinar Holden, Michael Hoel, Richard Layard, Stephen Nickel, Andrew Oswald and Christopher
Pissarides.
2Some documentation of the extent of effort bargaining is given in Millward and Stevens (1986)
Table 9.19 and 9.20. They report that 1984,76% of the establishments did bargain over physical 
working conditions and S5% over staffing/manning levels. Clark and Oswald (1989) find that 91 % of 
the unions bargain over working practices such as size of crews, demarcation, or the way in which new 
technology can be used.
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strict set of working rules that can be imposed by the union, or the employer may be 
free to dictate all relevant effort variables. Indeed, in these matters there are large 
differences both across industries and across countries. Because the results are 
sensitive to this assumption, two situations will be portrayed. In the first situation, the 
employer holds the right to dictate effort, but is willing to negotiate it with the union. 
In the second scenario, effort, like wages, is freely negotiable, with none of the parties 
having special privileges with respect to any of the bargaining variables. The two cases 
will be referred to as voluntary and forced effort bargaining respectively. Each of these 
situations are then compared to the case where it is not feasible to negotiate effort
Of course, voluntary effort bargaining entails a range of strictly Pareto-superior 
contracts compared to the pure wage bargain. These contracts all specify a lower level 
of effort and a lower wage than would have otherwise been the case. Another feature 
of the Pareto-dominating contracts is that they imply a higher level of employment than 
do the pure wage contracts. It is demonstrated that this is not due to any "work-sharing 
effects" from lower effort, an argument which is frequently put forward in support of 
shortening the working week. On the contrary, for a given wage, employment 
increases with effort under our specification of the model. Hence, the effect on 
employment is solely due to the lower wage. For the case of forced effort bargaining, 
the effect on employment is no longer clear, whereas the implications for wage and 
effort are the same.
Comparing effort levels in unionized and non-unionized firms, the model yields 
clear-cut predictions only with respect to effort variables which are explicitly accounted 
for in the firm-union negotiations. Such working conditions are expected to be better in 
unionized firms.
The model might explain the low union mark-up on wages in the public sector 
and also why the mark-up on wages differs significantly across industries. Here, these 
phenomena are due to differences in the scope of bargaining. The analysis also casts 
some doubt on the traditional definition of union power as being the mark-up on the 
competitive wage. A strong union may well agree to low wages if working conditions
10
are sufficiently luxurious. Thus, the mark-up on wages may overstate or understate the 
returns to unionization when effort is not taken into consideration.
Other papers that have studied bargaining over working conditions are Johnson 
(1990) and Clark (1991). Their main focus is whether bargaining over wages and 
effort or over wages and capital/labour ratios can mimic bargaining over wages and 
employment. In the model by Clark (1991) working conditions per se does not enter 
workers' utility functions. They only influence the union's preferences through the 
employment outcome. Johnson (1990) does consider the case where workers care 
about effort directly. However, he does not compare the outcome of a pure wage 
bargain with the outcome of bargaining over effort as well as wages, which is my main 
focus here.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I present necessary definitions 
and a characterization of the payoff functions for the firm and the union. Section 3 is 
an analysis of three different cases where effort is specified in the labour contract. In 
the benchmark case there is no union, and the firm sets both wages and effort. The 
second case assumes that the firm determines the effort and that there is wage 
bargaining afterwards. Finally, in case 3, there is simultaneous bargaining over effort 
and wages. In all cases the firm unilaterally chooses employment after the bargaining 
outcome becomes known. The endogenous variables are the wage rate, effort, profits, 
union utility, employment, production and product price. Section 4 contains a 
comparison of the outcomes under each of the model specifications. Section 5 gives a 
summary and discussion of the results.
2.The model
The list of working conditions that firms and workers can potentially bargain 
over is endless. Some examples are working hours, breaks, holidays, shifts, work
11
assignment, work intensity (speed of assembly line, say), supervision etc. In order to 
make the model as general as possible I simply treat effort as an arbitrary input. Thus, 
effort can be interpreted as the quality as well as the quantity of labour supplied by a 
single worker. When using this approach, I am careful not to define a productivity- 
dependent wage, such as a wage per unit of output or per hour. Consequently, my 
wage rate is the total payment to each worker per unit time employed.
2.1 The firm
The firm chooses the level of employment to maximize profit. It faces a constant 
elasticity of demand function:
Y = AP~X (1)
where X is the demand elasticity (A>1) and A is a positive constant. Perfect 
competition in the product market is described by (1) when X—> °°. Thus, the model 
specification is quite robust to the nature of competition in the product market. 
Production is given by:
Y = (iNe)a (2)
where N  is the number of employees, e is effort, and a  describes returns to scale.
Profit in excess of fixed cost payments is given by
II= PY-wN . (3)
If fixed costs are strictly positive, this formulation implies increasing returns to scale.
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Using equations (1), (2) and (3), profit maximization for a given e and w , 
gives price, production, labour demand and profit as functions of the wage and effort:
(4)
Y(w,e) = (5)
N(w,e) = Bw~eee~l (6)
n(W,e) = ‘( ^ j (7)
where e = X /(a  + X -a X )  and B = [A (£-1 ) / e ] £. The second order 
conditions imply that c >1.
We see from these expressions that the price depends positively on the wage and 
negatively on effort. Production, labour demand (which is equal to employment) and 
profit depend negatively on the wage and positively on effort. The positive relationship 
between effort and production is trivial in the sense that it generalizes to all reasonable 
demand functions: For a given wage increased effort means a downward shift in the 
firm's marginal costs. Hence, if the marginal revenue function is non-increasing, 
production will go up. The positive relationship between effort and employment is not 
equally general. With higher effort it is possible to increase production without hiring 
more labour. Therefore, one can construct demand and production functions for which 
higher productivity of labour leads to less employment.
The union has D identical members. N  of these members obtain a job in the
2.2 The Union
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firm. The other D-N  members get a utility of v. The utility enjoyed by each 
employed union member is assumed to be separable in wages and effort.
c = u(w) - g(e) (8)
I also assume that utility increases with the wage at a decreasing rate and that the utility 
decreases with effort at an increasing rate, i.e. u\w)>0, u"(w)<0, g'(e)>0 and 
g"(e)>0. Treating v as exogenous, the union maximizes the total expected utility of 
its members, Z.
Z(w,e) = N(w,e)(u(w) - g(e)) + (D-N(w,e))v (9)
We can rewrite equation (9) as:
Z(w,e) = N(w,e)(u(w) - g(e) -v) + vD (10)
To find the shape of the union utility function we first differentiate equation (10) 
with respect to w and e.
where r = u(w) - g(e) - v. Equations (11) and (12) imply:
dw | ff'(e) - (£ - l)f/e 
de ' z u'(w)-er/w (13)
In Appendix 1 ,1 show formally that the resulting union indifference curves in the w-e
14
plane are ellipsoides, as drawn in figure 1.
indifference curve
e
figure 1
dZ dZTo the right of the line, the sign of is positive, and to the left it is negative.
dZ dZSimilarly, the is negative to the right of the =0 line, and positive to the left.
Thus, since ^  <0 and > 0, the region for possible outcomes is the shaded area in
figure 1. If we compare the utility of two indifference curves, the one that lies inside
02
the other has the higher utility. The maximum utility is of course obtained when 
02
and ^ -=0, i.e. the crossing between the two lines in the figure.
3.Some scenarios
To evaluate the impact of effort bargaining, we need some standard of 
comparison. The two candidates are that effort is fixed unilaterally either by the firm or 
by the union. My reason for selecting the first alternative is that the second seems 
unrealistic. A firm, almost by definition, has some influence over working conditions.
As a benchmark case, I also include the situation where the firm controls both
15
variables (i.e., there is no union).
3.1 Case l:No Union 
If there is no union to secure the workers a share of the rent, the firm maximizes 
profit subject to the constraint that each worker's utility, c=u(w) - g(e), is not less 
than a minimum level, c1. The function u(w) - g(e)=cl is convex and upwards- 
sloping in the w-e plane.
w
isoprofit curve
e
figure 2
Total differentiation of the profit function (equation (7)) gives the isoprofit
curves
2
Since 1/7 = 0, the isoprofit curves are straight lines passing through the origin.
Profit increases when w/e decreases, i.e. when the slope of the isoprofit curves in 
figure 2 decreases. The firm chooses the solution on the function u(w) - g(e) - 
^= 0  that gives highest profit, i.e. the tangency point (w j,^ ).
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3.2 Case 2: Bargaining over wages
Here I assume that the firm chooses effort, e-e^,  and that the firm and the 
union bargain over the wages thereafter. The firm then makes its hiring decision, 
conditioning on the bargaining outcome. Effort requirements are assumed to be fixed 
in the contract period. In particular they can not be altered without the workers' 
consent3. The bargain over wages is described by the Nash bargaining solution
where Z q is the union's fallback level, and TJq is the firms fallback level (again 
without deducting fixed cost). In other words, Z q and ITq are the outcomes if there is 
a delay in reaching an agreement. The parameter p  describes the relative bargaining 
power of the two parties.
Differentiating the Nash maximand with respect to the wage we get:
Max X  = (/7-/7q)^(Z-Zo) st. e=«2» N(w,e) (15)
w
= ( ^ j m n - n o ) ^  i ( u \ W)  -  L f w i k )  - P iz - z o ) ] (16)
= 0 => (u'(w) - f f l n - i k )  - «Z-Z6) = o (17)
Now, total differentiation of equation (17) yields:
eg\e)(TI- Hq) + n(wu'(w) - r(e + pe - f$) + j3eg'(e))
(-wm"(w) - ^  + e u 'M )(n -  /T0) + (1 + p)(e- l ) « w )  - ^  ) / j
3If the effort requirement can be altered after the wage negotiation, the union cannot influence the 
workers utility, because a firm will then always choose effort so that u(w)-g(e) = c l .
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As already mentioned, the solution has to be where -=^ >0 and <0. It can be shown 
dx_Qis positive in this region. This means that the higher effort the firm
dw
chooses, the higher will be the wage reached by the following wage negotiation. The
firm's problem is therefore to choose effort in such a way that protit is maximized
dX jgiven that the solution has to be on the function defined by ~— = 0. Recall that I „J dw de *n
e'
w
isoprofit curve
e
figure 3
Under the assumption that u"'(w) >0 and £>2 (sufficient but not necessary 
conditions) it can be shown that the solution is characterized by | ax i.e.
where an isoprofit curve is tangential to the function defined by 4 ^  =0, (see Appendix 
2).4 This is illustrated in figure 3, where the solution is denoted (^2»vv2)* Setting 
equation (18) equal to we obtain;
[e(JI-ITq) + /3(£-l)/7][wK’(vi') - r - eg\e)\ - w2M"(w)(/7-i70)=0 (19)
Equations (17) and (19) then give the algebraic expressions for W2  and ^ 2-
4The necessary and sufficient condition is: w3(l/^)w"'(w)(/7-/^)) + £g"(e)[(n-IJ}) +
P(e-l)II\ -w2a"(w)[(*2X7M)) + /3(£-l)I71 > 0.
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33  Case 3: Bargaining over effort and wages.
In this case, the firm and the union bargain over wages and effort 
simultaneously. The firm then chooses the level of employment. Clearly, if effort is 
negotiated symmetrically to wages - with no party having the right to invoke minimum 
requirements or maximum limits - the Nash Bargaining solution can be derived as 
before. (This is done in the next section.) However, in order to accommodate the case 
where one party (here, the firm) can constrain effort, I will also derive the full contract 
curve (i.e. all Pareto optimal solutions).
One condition for Pareto efficiency is that ^  I = I , i.e. that ande \ n  de \z
isoprofit curve is tangential to a union indifference curve. If we set de \ n
I , i.e. set equation (14) equal to equation (13) we get
wu'(w) - r  - eg'(e) = 0 (20)
Total differentiation of (20) gives
(21)
Thus, equation (20) is downward sloping in the w-e plane, as illustrated in figure 4.
w
equation (20)
82 / Sw = 0
^indifference curve
isoprofit curve
e
figure 4
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In the special case where the marginal disutility of effort is constant (g"(e)=0)
the contract curve will be horizontal in the w-e plane, i.e. the level of the wage will be
unrelated to the bargaining power and fall back levels of the two parties and the three
parameters (A, a  and A). Thus, when g"(e)=0 we have a sticky wage result. In
the special case where the marginal utility of wage is constant the contract curve is
vertical in the w-e plane and we get a sticky effort result. As figure 4 shows, only
dZpoints on the curve defined by equation (20) where ^ -> 0  are Pareto efficient. Thus, 
the contract curve is jointly defined by equation (20) and the condition that ^ -> 0 . The 
profit increases and the union’s utility decreases along the curve when e increases.
4. A comparison of the cases:
I now compare the three cases in order to see the effect of each bargaining 
structure on wages, effort, firm's profit, union's utility, employment, production and 
price. The solutions to Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 are denoted with subscripts 1,2 and 
3 respectively.
4.1 Comparison of cases 2 and 3 
As already emphasized, it is not entirely clear what we should mean by a 
comparison of the cases 2 and 3. On the one hand we could think of fallback levels and 
bargaining power as variables invariant to the bargaining issues. This approach is 
consistent e.g. with the common interpretation of the fallback levels and the bargaining 
power as indices of payoff during a strike and of impatience respectively. Neither of 
these factors are likely to be dependent on the bargaining issues. On the other hand, 
since in the second case the firm is given power unilaterally to fix the effort level, the
20
most interesting question might be how case 3 differs from case 2 when the firm can 
refuse to bargain over effort. Within an industry the first comparison can be seen as 
studying the consequences of depriving the firm of the right to determine the effort 
level, whereas the second assumes that the firm voluntarily trades its privilege to 
determine effort. If on the other hand the comparison is across industries, there may be 
technological factors determining what variables are negotiable, and "forced" effort 
bargaining may be the more interesting case. Below I report both.
Recall that equation (17) and (19) give the solution for case 2.
[£ ( 7 7 - /^ )  + $ £ - 1)/7][ wm’(w) - r  - eg\e)] - w V ( w ) ( / 7 - / 7 o ) = 0  (19)
Since m"(w)<0 and /7-/70>0, u' (w)  - r - eg' (e)  must be less than zero for 
equation (19) to hold. This expression is less than zero above the contract curve and 
greater than zero below. Thus, the solution to case 2 must be above the contract curve. 
Only in the case where the marginal utility of income is constant (m"(w)=0) will the 
solution to case 2 be on the contract curve.
indifference curve = o
6 w
w
isoprofil curve
w,'a
contract curve
e
figure 5
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Comparison of cases 2 and 3 with "forced" effort bargaining
When the firm is denied the right to determine effort, with given fallback levels
and bargaining power, we need to find the Nash bargaining solution for both the
parameters w and e. If the Nash maximand is again denoted X, the solution must 
BX dXhave the property that = -^-^0. Rather than deriving the explicit solution, we can
dXnow use diagram 5. The line g^- =0 is already there, and since the bargain solution is 
Pareto-optimal, it must be described by the intersection of this line and the contract 
curve, i.e. the point (wa,ea). It can be seen from figure 5 that the wage and effort will 
then be lower when the two parties bargain over both wages and effort. Note that the 
lower effort is desirable for the union not because it raises employment -on the 
contrary, for a given wage it lowers employment, -but because it raises the utility of 
employed workers. It can also be seen that profit will be lower and the union’s utility 
higher in case 3 compared to case 2.
Without making further assumptions, we cannot show whether employment will 
be higher or lower in case 3 compared to case 2. Since profit is lower in case 3 we 
know that (^>3 > (^-)2, and so production is lower and price higher in case 3 compared 
to case 2.
Comparison of cases 2 and 3 with voluntary effort bargaining
When the firm trades its privilege to determine effort voluntarily, the wage-effort 
bargain will Pareto dominate the pure wage bargain. The Pareto superior solutions lie 
on the contract curve between and ec in figure 5. Here, employment is 
unambiguously higher than in case 2. From equation (7) we have that 
and since we have that 0^-)3>( -^)2* Since also ^ 3<^2 this implies
N$>N2 - Because here >772, production will be higher and price lower in case 3 
compared to case 2.
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4.2 Comparison of the non-union case with the union cases 
In figure 6 we have drawn the solutions to cases 1,2 and 3. If the outside 
opportunity,v, is equal to c 1, the u(w)-g(e)-cl =0 function intersects the contract 
curve where w=w1 and e=el . This is the case drawn in figure 6. It can then be 
seen from figure 6 that the wage will be higher and effort lower in case 3 compared to 
case 1. The latter of these two results (lower effort) was also noted by Johnson 
(1990). This implies that employment and production will be lower and prices higher 
in the union case with effort bargaining than in the non-union case.5
w
6 X / 6 w  =0
u ( w) -  g ( e )- c 1 =0
N = N
c o n t r a c t  curve
e e1
figure 6
Apart from the level of effort, the qualitative differences between the two union cases 
and the non-union case are the same. When there is bargaining over wages only, effort 
can be higher in the unionized firm than in the non-unionized firm. Whether it will be 
higher or lower depends on how well the union can compensate itself for higher effort 
by getting higher wages in the wage negotiation. One important factor is the concavity 
of the utility function, -w"(w). The higher -w"(w), the less the union is able to 
compensate its members. This is because the higher - m " ( w ) ,  the less the unions 
utility will increase when the wage goes up, whereas profit decreases in the same 
proportion regardless of worker utility. The wage will thus respond less to an increase
5These results hold true also if v> cl.
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in effort, and effort will be correspondingly higher. Wages will be higher in case 2 
than in case 1 since the solution to case 2 lies above the contract curve. Employment 
will be lower in case 2 than in case 1. This can be seen by looking at the constant 
employment line where N=Ni> drawn in figure 6. The N=N± line has a smaller 
slope than the iso-profit curves, N = (*“ )^(^ r)* To the left of the N=Ni line, 
employment is lower than N i , to the right it is higher. Production will be lower and 
price higher in case 2 compared to case 1, since profit is lower in case 2 than in case 1.
5. Summary and discussion 
The main results in the paper are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the results
Comparison of 
Case 1 with 
Case 2 and Case 3
Comparison of Case 2 with Case 3
forced effort bargain voluntary effort bargain
J7i > /72 n i > n 2 n 1 > n 3 n 1 < n 3
Zj > z 3 < z 3 Z2 < z 3
Wj < w2 Wj < W3 w2 < w3 w2 > w3
e\ %e2 e\ >e3 e2 > e 3 vv2 > W3
2Vi > N 2 n , > n 3 n 2 <n 3 n 2 $ n 3
Y\ > Y2 *1 >^3 Y2 < Y3 Y2 > Y3
P l < P2 P ,< P 3 P2 > P l P2 <P3
Case 1: Non-union case, Case 2: Bargain over effort only, Case 3: Bargain
over wages and effort, J7=profit, Z=union utility, w=wage, e=effort, 
/^employment, ^production, /^product price.
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If the firm is deprived of the right to determine effort and instead has to bargain 
over effort and wages, the firm's profit is reduced and the union's utility increased. In 
this case, wages, effort and production are lower and price higher than when 
bargaining is only over wages. Whether employment is lower or higher when the 
bargain includes effort is not possible to say without further assumptions.
If the firm has the right to determine the effort level when negotiations with the
l
union fail, wages, effort and price are lower and employment and production higher 
when bargaining is over both effort and wages and not over wages only.
Freeman and Medoff (1984) report some empirical comparisons of productivity 
levels in unionized and non-unionized firms (Table 11.1). They find that the effect of 
unionization on productivity is not conclusive, though mainly positive. Metcalf (1988) 
finds that unions are associated with lower productivity. Our results suggest that the 
inconclusiveness may be due to variations in bargaining issues across firms (and 
unions). In firms where there is bargaining over productivity (effort) variables, effort 
is lower than in the non-unionized firms. On the other hand, our model does not yield 
predictions about the relative productivity levels when the bargain is over wages only. 
Without knowing the scope of firm-union negotiations it is therefore not possible to say 
whether effort (productivity) will go down or up in the case of unionization.
The union mark-up on wages is generally found to be lower in public sectors
than in private.6 Mill ward and Stevens (1986) present evidence that bargaining over
effort is more common in the public sector than in the private.7 Thus, the lower
union mark-up in the public sector could be explained by a broader scope of bargaining
in the public sector. The model might similarly help to explain the big differences in
union mark-up on wages across industries, as documented by Stewart (1983,1987) and
Lewis (1986). More generally, the analysis of unions based on the assumption that
unions ignore questions of effort is suspect. The mark-up on the competitive wage is
6Lewis (1990) and Ehrenberg and Schwartz (1986) survey different studies. It should be mentioned 
that both Lewis and Ehrenberg and Schwartz are critical of many of the studies, and suspect that they 
underestimate the union mark-up on wages in the public sector.
7Table 19.19 and 19.20.
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frequently used as a measure of union power, (see e.g. Layard and Nickell (1986)). 
This measure ignores that a union may use some of its power to secure good working 
conditions. Although in our model, the wage is a monotonically increasing function of 
union bargaining power, inter-industry differences in the scope of bargaining, in 
technology (i.e. the costliness of providing good working conditions) and taste (caused 
eg by differences in workers'wealth) may destroy this relationship. Hence, the mark 
up on the competitive wage is not an entirely reliable measure of union power. It may 
overstate the returns to unionization if effort is higher in unionized firms and understate 
the returns if effort is lower.
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Appendix 1.
I will here show that the union's indifference curves are ellipsoids in the w-e
plane.
BZ BZSince the union utility, Z, is a function of e and w, I z = " gg- /  g ^  •
Thus,
1 z > 0 if >0 and ^ < 0  or if ^ < 0  and ^ > 0  de 1 Bw Be Bw Be
I z < 0 if ^ X )  and ^ > 0  or if ^ < 0  and ^ —<0 de 1 Bw Be Bw Be
<ksL\z  = co if |^ = 0  a n d ^ |z = 0 if ^ = 0  
de |Z 3w de u  Be
BZ BZThe ^—=0 function intersects the =0 function only once, and for small values of eBw Be
BZ BZthe w that solves r:— =0 is higher than the w that solves -=^—=0. Also, for high values dw Be
BZ BZof e, the w that solves ^—=0 is lower than the w that solves ^—=0 (Appendix la). ItBw de
can also be shown that > 0 when ^ -> 0  and ^ < 0  and^£- < 0 when ^ < 0  andde2 Bw Be de2 dw
BZ>0 (Appendix lb). Hence, the indifference curves are ellipsoids.de
Appendix la
Z = Bw'z^ ' \u {w )  - g(e) -v) + vD (A l.l)
7Y7—  = 0 <=> u\w) - (^ )  (u(w)-g(e)-v) = 0 (A 1.2)
0 <=> -g\e) + (u(w)-g(e)-v) = 0 (A1.3)
^ l a z  n = ----------------   (A 1.4)
^  5 T °  (e -l)u '(w )-w u"(w )
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dw \-rr _ eg \ c) + eg"(e) 
^ ' f =0 (e - lK (w )
(A1.5)
Since u'(w) > 0, g ’(e) > 0, m"(w) < 0 and g"(e) > 0 ^ 1  az n < ^ - l a z  n for
d e & = 0
dZ dZa given w and e. Thus, the =—=0 curve does only intersect the =0 curve once,dw de
dZ dZand for small values of e, the w that solves =—=0 is higher than the w that solvesdw de
dZ dZ=0. Conversely, for high e the w that solves =— is lower than that for^r—.dw de
Appendix l t>
I will here show here that | ^ 0 when ^  0 and ^  § 0
de2 lz dw de
dw | _ g '(e )-(e - 1 )r/e 
de ' z u'(w) - erjw (A1.6)
-= u(w) - g(e) - v
d2w
de 2 I z
de Izj . f c j
3w de ' z (A 1.7)
de
g"(e) + (e-1 }J^uXw) - e£ ) + (£ -l)^ '(eK (w ) - — f
wfe'te))2 (A1.8)
f t l j ^ - 1  =
de lz
, . M .  , , 4 . , . ,  a l l
(«'(vv) -
(A1.9)
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I will look at the sign of I _ along the curve defined by 1 „  = 1 _de2 12 de 1 n  de
(equation (20) in the text)
=>g'(e) = WU'(We ) ' r  (A1.10)
By inserting equation (A1.10) in (A1.8) and (A1.9) we get
t t i J  (A1
“  (»•(») - < 0  m
d f& H j , ^ 1  L w, eV '(e) - w V tw )
dw de z e^u\w )  - e^-)
(A1.13)
02
since £"(£) >0, w"(h0<0 and =— = N (u'(w ) - e t / w ) ,  we have shown thatdw
lz ^ 0 when =— ^ 0 and > 0 along the curve defined by equation (20) in
de2 dw de
the text. Since equation (20) is monotonic (for a given w there is only one e and for a
dZ 02
given e there is only one w), and since 1 £> 0 when > 0 and < 0 , we
know that I z ^  O i f ^ -  ^ O a n d ^  $ 0 de2 dw de
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Appendix 2.
I will here show that when I a* = *jf-, I dx >0, which is needed forde I— =o e i — =o
aw ow
case 2 to have an interior solution.
. e g \e )(n - I7q) + r(wu'(w) - r(e + p e - p )  + peg'(e))uyy. —--------------------------e----------    (A2 1)
*  ' ^ =0 (-H-u"(w)-e. + £«'(*v))(n-71b) + ( l+ j3 )(e - l) (« '(H ')- f  )/7
When I ax _ = we get (after a lot of algebra)
dw
^ 2  = ( ^ ( ^ '" ( w X / T - f T o )  + cg'’(e)[(iT-f70) + /5(e-l)(/7-/^)) ]
-w2n"(w)[(e-2)(/7-/70) +/3(e-l)/7]} (A2.2)
where q=(-wu"(w) -&+ £u'(w))(/7-J7o) + (1+/?)(£-l)(w'(w) - ^ )/7> 0  
Under the assumption that m " ’( w ) > 0 and £>2, all the terms are positive.
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Chapter 2: TEMPORARILY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND
LABOUR CONTRACTS8
1. Introduction
In the literature on adverse selection in the labour market it has been common to 
assume either (i) that the firm can never learn anything about the abilities of individual 
workers, or (ii) that learning is instantaneous. The first assumption is made by e.g. 
Weiss (1980), whereas the second is associated with the works of Guasch and Weiss 
(1980,1981,1982). Arguably, the intermediate case is more realistic; when a worker 
first applies for a job, the firm's estimate of the worker's productivity is imperfect and 
less precise than that held by the worker himself. However, as time goes by, the 
employer's estimate is improved - possibly converging to the true productivity. This 
paper is concerned with the optimal labour contracts in such an environment.
In a world with no capital market imperfections, this intermediate case does not 
differ in any important way from the situation where the employer learns 
instantaneously, because payment can just be deferred until productivity is revealed. 
But the capital markets are empirically known to be imperfect; a substantial number of 
workers being severely credit rationed.9 In this situation, the firm will impose a cost 
on the worker if the labour contract specifies a very low wage early in tenure. The 
present model therefore studies the consequences for optimal labour contracts of 
workers being more severely credit rationed than firms.
In order to understand the features of the model, it is useful to recall the analysis
o
Valuable comments and suggestions have been received from Tore Ellingsen, Eric Hansen, Alan 
Manning, Dilip Mookherjee, John Moore, Tore Nilssen, Christopher Pissarides and Bengt Rosen.
9 Jappelli (1990) estimates that 20% of the U.S. families are credit rationed. He also reports that 
important variables are; low age, no established credit history and low income. It should also be 
emphasized that Jappelli defined a person as credit rationed only if he was unable to obtain any credit at 
all. In another recent paper, Mayfield (1990) finds that 43% of households under the age of 30 are credit 
constrained and that 37% of households under the age of 50 face significant constraints.
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of Guasch and Weiss (1980, 1981, 1982). They show that if applicants can be 
subjected to a test, where the test score is related to their expected productivity (known 
to the worker), the firm can sort the applicants by requiring that each worker pays an 
application fee and offer them contracts which are contingent on the test scores. In 
equilibrium, only highly productive workers will apply. Thus, the firm has achieved 
its aim; to attract able workers without having to pay less able workers the same wage. 
This result remains valid within the present model as well. But other results do not 
survive. First, in Guasch and Weiss there will be no inefficient terminations under the 
assumption of competition in the labour market. In the present paper conditions are 
developed under which such terminations are optimal. Secondly, Guasch and Weiss 
conclude that a substantial number of workers (everyone who pass a certain test) will 
be overpaid - at least late in their career.10 Here, I show that this is an artefact due to 
the assumption that there are only two possible productivity levels. With risk neutral 
workers, typically only the very best worker will receive a payment in excess of the 
value of his marginal product. In addition to these two results, the present framework 
also allows me to address some new questions. E.g., large firms may have a 
comparative advantage in employing workers of high productivity, and that top wages 
will vary less over the business cycle than do other wages.
As indicated, the model is largely driven by the following two assumptions. 
First, instead of only two possible productivity levels, I allow for a continuum. 
(Actually, for much of the analysis three levels would suffice.) Secondly, capital 
markets are not perfect A third important assumption is that productivity levels are not 
verifiable. The non-verifiability of production levels means that the worker cannot be 
fined for bad performance ex post (if he could, consumption smoothing is not a 
problem). In the absence of reputation building by firms, it may also exclude as non- 
credible any wage schedule depending on actual productivity.
Under these assumptions it may be profitable to use inefficient terminations as a
10 If the test is taken to be an initial employment period, and capital markets are perfect, this is a valid 
interpretation of their analysis.
self-selection device, because it is costly to induce self-selection by paying a low wage 
to credit constrained workers. The workers need to finance consumption from wage 
payments, and will prefer a flatter wage schedule to a steeper one. The longer it takes 
to learn the worker's productivity, the more important is the capital market 
imperfections, and the more willing is the firm to use termination threats as a self 
selection device.
As in the model of Guasch and Weiss (1981), the firm must compensate for a 
low initial wage by promising later to pay an expected wage which is higher than the 
workers' expected productivity. This of course begs the question of credibility. Here, 
there is an additional credibility problem associated with the threat of firing productive 
workers.11 The common way to defend such deviations from sequential rationality is 
that the firm lives for many periods and can establish a reputation for sticking to the ex 
ante optimal contract. But this explanation does not look entirely convincing in the 
present context, for the following reason. The ex ante optimal contract specifies that 
only the very highest possible productivity will earn a wage premium.12 Presumably, 
this productivity level will occur so rarely, and require such a large premium, that even 
concerns for reputation cannot keep the firm from cheating after the fact (remember, 
productivity levels are not verifiable). A natural way to get around this problem is for 
the firm to condition its remuneration on relative rather than absolute performance. 
Arguably, a rank-order contract is easily verifiable. At the very least it seems a more 
convincing scheme around which to build a reputation.
Here, it is shown that a rank-order contract will perform "almost” as well as the
11 In the present model, it may be credible to terminate productive workers. Suppose that abilities are 
not firm-specific, and that firms can observe each others employment contracts and wage offers. Then it 
becomes impossible to pay employees less than their marginal revenue product in period 2: here, the 
wage offer by the original employer reveals the employee's productivity, and competitors will bid the 
wage up to the point where the firm earns no rent on the worker. Knowing that this will happen, the firm 
might as well fire the worker without revealing her type through a wage offer. Separation is therefore ex 
post costless for the firm.
12 This entails a technical problem as well: If there is an interval of possible productivities is unbounded 
from above, the problem has no solution.
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ex ante optimal contract. A feature of the contract is that a prize is given to the most 
productive worker. A similar result has earlier been derived in a moral hazard 
framework by Rosen (1986).
Interestingly, if the firms are restricted to rank-order contracts the model suggests 
that self-selection can be obtained at a smaller cost in a large firm. In a small firm, even 
a less able worker has a realistic chance of being the the most productive, and the wage 
profile therefore has to be steeper to deter such workers from applying. Consequently, 
we may expect large firms to offer contracts inducing the more able workers to apply, 
whereas small firms employ workers who are less optimistic with respect to future 
productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. The 
optimal contract when firms do not cheat are derived in 3. In section 4 ,1 describe the 
optimal rank-order contract The relation to other literature is spelled out in section 5.
2. The model
Employees can be of two types, a  and p. The type is private information to 
each worker. Type a  has a higher expected productivity in the industry than type p . 
Employees live for two periods. Productivity in period 1 is observed only ex post, just 
prior to period 2.
Productivity, x, in period 2 is equal to actual productivity in period 1. Wage in 
period 1 is denoted wj and w 2 (jc) denotes wage in period two given that the 
productivity in period 1 was x.
Productivity is a random variable. Each type is described by a density function 
f iW *  (1 € &>P) with support X=[/,m ]. I will assume that f a (x)lfp(x) is 
increasing in jc, i.e. the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). Let Et denote 
the expected value of the marginal productivity of workers of type 1. The number of
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a-types and p -types in the economy is given and jj. is the proportion of a-types. 
Firms and employees are risk neutral. Firms have a zero discount rate, but employees 
are assumed to have a positive discount rate r. This is a simple way to capture the fact 
that workers' access to credit is worse than that of the firm.13
Expected utility for a worker of type i joining the industry is
J| mi(x)fi(x)dx + FfccdwXrt
tfi = wn + — -----------^ -------------------  ie{a,P)  (1)
where w is the wage in another industry and xc is the minimum productivity level 
required to stay in the firm in period 2. I.e., expected utility is equal to wage in period 
1 plus expected wage payments in period 2 divided by 1+r. The criterion for a i- 
worker to join the industry (the industry participation constraint) is
+ i e (a,P) (PC)
I assume that (PC) is satisfied for both a-types and p-types. All the firms in the 
industry have an identical constant returns to scale technology. Each firm maximizes 
profit and takes the product price, the workers' reservation utility and the employment 
contracts of other firms as given. Without loss of generality the product price is 
normalized to 1.
Firms live forever. There is free entry into the industry, so that in equilibrium it 
is not possible for a firm to enter and earn positive profits. Since we have a constant 
returns to scale technology, the equilibrium number of firms is indeterminate.
1-5
A more rigorous approach would be to define workers' utility over consumption in the two periods, 
and let preferences be convex. Since workers are assumed to be risk neutral, there is no room for an 
insurance market Let interest rates be zero. A risk neutral worker would wish to equate marginal utility 
of consumption in period 1 with the marginal utility of expected consumption in period 2. Of course, if 
the wage in period 1 is lower than the wage in period 2, this would require borrowing. If the worker 
face an absolute credit constraint or would have to pay a larger interest than the employer, a higher wage 
in period 1, ceteris paribus, yields a greater benefit to the worker than it is costly to the firm.
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Employees are equally productive in each firm.14 Further, I assume that firms 
can observe each others' contracts, but not a particular worker's productivity. This 
implies that for each group of workers who earn the same wage, the wage has to be 
greater than or equal to their average expected productivity. Formally;
w2 tM  > Et[x Iw2 l(xf)] for all x'eX, ie  {a,/J)
The fact that only contracts are observable implies that any two workers earning 
the same wage look the same to an outside firm, as do all workers who are fired. This 
assumption provides a link between this article and the literature on visible and invisible 
workers, as developed by Waldman (1984) and Milgrom and Oster (1987) and the 
work by Geenwald (1986). There too, promotion, wage rises and firing decisions are 
signals to the market about a specific workers quality, and outside firms have less 
information than the does the present employer. I will assume that the expected 
productivity given that a worker is fired is less than the alternative wage, i.e. Et [x\x  
^ *«] < w. This implies that workers who are fired will move to another industry. 
This is only a simplification and do not affect any of the main results.
Clearly, termination of productive relationships occurs if xcl>w. Note that if
outside firms could distinguish between the workers who are fired, xcl can not be
above w. Workers with productivities above w would then immediately be hired by
another firm and due to competition their wage would be equal to their productivity.
By implication, firing would not be an effective threat in the first place. Thus, my
assumption of a continuum of possible performance levels as opposed to only two, as
e.g. in Guasch and Weiss (1980, 1981., 1982), is instrumental in bringing about ex
post inefficient firing when there is more than one firm in the industry.15 Finally, I
14As long as productivity in one firm is positively correlated with productivity in another firm a version 
of the results go through.
15To be precise, what is needed is more than one performance level of those who are fired, and that the 
former employer have more information about the workers than a potential employer.
38
make the assumption that Ea < vv, where Ea is the average productivity of an a - 
type in period 1. This assumption ensures that my set-up where workers prefer wage 
payments in period 1 to wage payments in period 2 is consistent.16
3.EquiIibrium reward schemes 
As a benchmark case, I now derive the equilibrium wage contract when firms can 
distinguish a-types from /?-types ex ante. Then I go on to characterize the 
equilibrium second-best contracts in the case with ex ante asymmetric information.
Equilibrium is defined by; (i) there is no other contract that give workers higher 
utility and firms non-negative profit, given that the other firms pursue the equilibrium 
strategy, and (ii) for each group of workers earning the same wage in period 2, the 
wage has to be greater than or equal to their average expected productivity.
To find the optimal wage contracts i.e. and w 2 i0t) we solve the 
following maximization problem;
16If I had assumed that the firm had to pay a training cost, k, to make use of a new worker the weaker 
assumption would have been E a -k<w.
3.1 Benchmark case: Full information
Consider the expected profit to firm j  from employing an i-type worker
nj t = Et -w n+  I (x- W2 i(x))fl(x) dx 
Jxc
(3)
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Max Ux (MP.l)
st. (l.a) n jt >o
(1 .b) w2 tUO > Et[x Iw2 tCr 01 for all *'eX, i e {a ,p}
This yields,
Proposition 1: If the workers' types are observable ex ante, the equilibrium contract 
has the following properties;
w2l(xr)= E l[x lw2 tC-xO]
i.e., each wage group is paid its average expected productivity.
Proof: (l.a) will hold with equality since a worker's utility can always be increased by 
lowering profit, (l.b) will hold with equality since workers prefer wage payments in 
period 1 to wage payments in period 2. ♦
This result is intuitive. The firm offers the the highest possible period 1 wage 
subject to the requirement that workers in each wage category in period 2 are paid at 
least their average expected marginal product. Note that because workers are risk 
neutral, the wage schedule in period 2 is indeterminate. An,example is w2l(x) = x 
for all x.
Obviously, in this case inefficient terminations would serve no purpose, so 
xcl=w. Formally, this can be checked by substituting the optimal wage schedules
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given in proposition 1 into Uv (equation (1));
I
m
xfi(x)dx + Fi(Xcdw
u t =Ei + — — ------------ <4 )
and differentiate with respect to xci, yielding the first-order condition
• / f t f c  +fi(xcJw  = 0 (5)
Thus, of course, workers will stay in the firm if and only if their productivity in the 
firm is higher than their productivity outside.
3.2 Asymmetric information
When workers know more about their productivities than do firms, the first-best 
contract can no longer be implemented. The reason is that low productivity workers 
would like to masquerade as high productivity workers. Formally,
Observation 1: Workers of type p  prefer an a-contract to an /^-contract:
Proof: To prove this, it is sufficient to show that
r i tm
w2a(x)fp(x)dx £ I w2p(xyp(x)dx since tvj a>w .
Jw
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From Proposition 1 we know that;
r i cm
w2 a(x)fp(x)dx = I Ea[x\w2a(x)]fp(x)dx
Jw
and
cm cm
I W2 fl(x)fp(x)dx =1 E fix \w 2p(x)]f^x)dx  
Jw Jw
Denote the expected productivity of /3-type who in an a-contract is paid 
w2 a W  as Ep[x  I w 2 «(*)]• A P~lYPe has the same expected productivity in 
period 2, regardless of whether he works in an a-contract or a /3-contract, thus,
r i cm
E flx \w 2p(x)]fp(x)dx = I Ep[x I w2a(x)] fp{x)dx.
Jw
In Appendix 1 it is shown that MLRP implies that Ea[x I w2a (jc)] >
Ep[x I w2a (r)] completing the proof. ♦
With the first best wage schedule, an a-worker will have a higher period 1 wage than 
does a /3-worker, and a /3-worker will (in expectation) earn at least as much in the 
second period if he opts for an a-contract as if he opts for an /3-contract.
To avoid low productivity workers selecting a contract aimed at high productivity 
workers, the firm can alter the contract so as to induce self-selection. I will now 
characterize the separating equilibrium. In Appendix 2 I show that no pooling 
equilibrium in pure strategies exists and derive conditions under which the separating
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equilibria exist.
I will (in common with most papers on self-selection) assume that once a worker 
have signed a contract, the firm can credibly commit not to renegotiate, due to 
reputation effects. Also, the worker can not leave the firm immediately after he has 
signed a contract. For simplicity, assume that the worker can not leave until beginning 
of period 2.
A separating equilibrium is defined by (i) there exists no other contract that 
workers prefer and give non-negative profit, given that the other firms pursue the 
equilibrium strategy, (ii) for each group of workers earning the same period 2 wage, 
the wage has to be greater than or equal to their average expected productivity, and (iii) 
a p- worker does not prefer an a-contract to a /^-contract, and vice versa.
Now the maximization problem becomes
Constraints (2.a) and (2.b) are the same as in the symmetric information case.
Max C/j = w\i +
Wl,,W2iW
mi(x)fi(x)dx + Ft(xa)w
(MP.2)1+r
772
st.(2.a) I l j t -  Et -w n+  I (x -w 2 i(x))fl dx >
Jxa
(2.b) w2 jOO > Et[x I w2 tCO] for all x'eX
(2.c) Up > w \a +
W2 a(x)fp(x)dx + Fftxcc&w
1+r
rI w2ff$)fJ<x)dx + F c fa ^w
1+r
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Constraints (2.c) and (2.d) are the incentive compatibility constraints, and UI is the
maximum utility an i-type can get given a separating contact. Clearly, (2.a) will be 
binding for a-workers since their utility can always be increased without affecting 
incentive constraints, by lowering profit. (2 .c) also binds with respect to the a- 
workers. Note that if it did not, their utility (for given profit) could be increased by 
transferring wage payments from period 2 to period 1 and/or lowering the cut-off 
productivity xca.
The best contract for p-types is the same as under full information, this contract 
is feasible and no other feasible contract gives p -workers higher utility. It will be 
straightforward to show that a-workers strictly prefer the the a-contract to the p- 
contract, i.e. (2.d) will not be binding.
Proposition 2: In a separating equilibrium,
a(x) = x  for all x < m
Proof: (i) If W2aOO=W2 «(*")» x'*x"  then there exists another contract where 
W2a(x ')=x' anc* ^ 2  «(*")=*” which gives the same profit to the firm and the 
same utility to a-workers, but due to the MLRP, will lower p -types utility from an 
a-contract, contradicting the assumption that (2.c) is binding. The fact that 
wfcaOO * w2 a(x ") if x ’*x", together with (2.b), imply that W2  a(x) > x.
wla  = min Ea,
(x-w)fp(x)dx
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Let W2a(m ) =m ' If w 2 <*(*')>*'for x'<m, then there exists another 
contract where W2a(x ')=x' and W2 a (m)>m' which gives the same profit and 
utility to a-workers, but, because of MLRP, will lower p-types utility from an a- 
contract, contradicting that (2.c) is binding. This implies that W2 a(x )=x if x<m 
and W2 a(m)>m.
(ii) Using the now established properties that w 2 « (* )= *  ^  x<m ,
are binding, we get the wage schedule described in Proposition 2. w \a can't be 
larger than Ea since W2 a(x) > x , and thus it would violate the non-negative profit 
condition. It is straightforward to show that a-workers strictly prefer the a-contract 
to a j3-contract, i.e. (2.d) is not binding. ♦
In previous literature, the feature that only one performance level is rewarded by 
a wage exceeding the value of the performance has not been emphasized. The reason is 
presumably that in these models there are only two performance levels; pass or fail. 
Thus, the impression they give that a large proportion of retained workers should be 
overpaid is misleading. The reason why only performance level m is overpaid, if any, 
is that by MLRP, f a (x)/fp(x) is maximized at m. Thus, the proportion a-types is 
at its highest at m and therefore only m-performers are awarded a "prize".
There are two ways to deter low productivity workers from choosing a contract 
intended for the high productivity workers; either by a high cut-off, xca, or by a low 
initial wage, being compensated by a higher expected wage in period 2. The latter 
(upwards sloping wage schedule) is the self-selection device identified by Guasch and 
Weiss. If self-selection is obtained solely by a high cut-off level, then w\ a=Ea anc* 
w2 arx  f°r aH x - An explicit expression for the cut-off level in this case can be 
found by inserting this wage schedule into (2.c) and require it to hold with equality.
This is not to say that the two self-selection devices are mutually exclusive. It is
w2a(m)>m, Up =Ep +\rI xfp(x)dx + Fp(w)
[Jw
w / [ 1+r] and that (2 .a) and (2 .c)
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not guaranteed when w2a (m)> m, that x ca = w. Instead, there is a trade-off 
between the steepness of the wage schedule and the productivity at which the workers 
are fired. The higher is the cut-off productivity xca, the higher is and the 
lower is u>2a (m). Thus, having x ca above w will give a-workers flatter wage 
schedules than if xca=w. If x ca is sufficiently above vv, we can even have that 
w\ a is greater than w\ p, which is equal to Ep.
It is interesting to see what determines the optimal mix of these two self-selection 
devices. This can be done most simply by characterizing the optimal cut-off 
productivity, xca. To do this, substitute the wage schedules given in Proposition 2, 
when w\ a<Ea, into Ua
. . r
Jx,
pm
w j a + I xfa(x)dx + Ea + Fa(xcaW
Ua = ---------- * = ------- ^ ----------------------  (6)
Differentiating, we have
. . .  (Xca-™)
d u  a  _  ________
M m )
rfpfacod -fa frccd i  1 +  r  -
(7)
dxca w t f§fm)
( l + r ) ( l + r -  / - - r )  fokm)
Observation 2: Ex post inefficient terminations are optimal if and only if
lim ^ - > 0
dxca
x„ -»w+ ca
This condition is easily translated into
Proposition 3: The a-contract given in Proposition 2 entails inefficient terminations 
iff
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(i d
/ e W faini)
In other words, xca will be above vv if and only if condition (IT) holds. Thus, a 
necessary condition for involuntary separations is that fp(w)/fa(yv)>l- Involuntary 
separations is more likely the higher is r, fp(w)/fcfiw) and fp(m)/fa (m). Optimal 
xca, if above vv, is found where (IT) holds with equality
A high r reflects a long duration of period 1. Since firing is a way of making 
wage schedules flatter, this option becomes more attractive when productivities are 
revealed slowly. To fire workers of productivity, say, xp becomes less costly the 
lower is f a (xj) and more effective the higher is fp(xj-). Similarly, for a higher 
fp(m)/fa (m), the wage schedule has to be steeper to keep the /3-workers from 
applying, and thus ex post inefficient firing becomes more attractive as a self-selection 
device.
It is also worth noting that Proposition 3 is derived under the assumption that 
reservation wages are equal for the two types of worker. If I had assumed different 
alternative wages, with wa > wp, as e.g. in Weiss (1980) (IT) would become.
(xca ■ wp)fp(Xca)
.  (Xca" wa)fa(Xca) fa <m) V '
and there would always be some involuntary separations (as xca goes to wa the 
denominator goes to zero).
Thus, if wa > wp, or if wa = wp and the condition (IT) holds, we will have an 
equilibrium where a proportion of the firms will only employ p -types and the other 
ones only employ a-types and terminate some productive relationships. The workers 
can then choose between firms that give a high premium for being a top performer, 
and/or a higher initial wage, where requirements for staying are strong, and firms but
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where requirements for staying (i.e. making partners, getting tenure or passing an 
intermediate exam) are less harsh, but top performers less well paid and/or receive 
lower initial wages.
4. Rank-order contracts 
The property that only the production level m should be honoured by a prize 
looks fragile. The very best production level will almost never be attained by any 
worker, and the premium would have to be enormous. If productivity is not perfectly 
verifiable, no amount of reputation would be enough to keep the firm from cheating if 
the case were to arise. In short, the contract is not convincing. Also, as mentioned in 
footnote 4, if the interval of possible productivities had been unbounded from above, 
the problem would have no solution.
A more robust contract, avoiding both these problems, would be a rank-order 
contract, the firm paying wages according to relative performance. This makes the 
firms payment in period 2 invariant to the actual productivity of the workers in period 
1. Such rank-order tournaments have earlier been suggested by Carmichael (1983) and 
Malcomson (1984, 1986) to mitigate the problem of non-verifiability of productivity 
levels. The following notation will be used:
Pt(i): the probability that an t-type is of rank i, given an i-contract
Ppa(i): the probability an p -type is of rank /, given that he opts for an a-
contract
E t[x I i] : the expected marginal productivity of an i-type, given rank i and 
given an i- contract.
c{. the highest rank that will stay in the firm given an i-contract. (The higher is the 
rank the lower is the productivity).
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Consider the case of observable types and the following rank-order contract. An 
i-worker of rank i is paid his expected productivity given his rank i.e. 
W2 l(i)=El[x I /]. The firm commits to keep only workers of lower rank than, c*. 
Those of higher rank (the higher the rank the lower the productivity) than c *  gets 
fired, where Et[x I i <c* ] >w  and Et[xI i > c* ] < w. It is easy to see that such 
a rank-order contract mimics the first best contract when the number of employees is 
large.
To see how the rank order contracts work under asymmetric information, I have 
to modify the model slightly. To obtain an equilibrium with more than one firm under 
the assumption of asymmetric information and rank order contracts, the production 
technology can no longer yield constant returns to scale. Instead, I assume that there is 
a positive entry cost T and that production is concave in total labour input, Z, where 
Z - l x . (These features could have been introduced from the beginning at a cost of 
slightly more complex expressions). The reason why it is necessary with a concave 
production function, g(Z), is that, in a separating a-contract, unit labour cost will be 
a decreasing function of number of people employed in the firm. The positive entry 
cost ensures that equilibrium is well defined.
Competition in the labour market will ensure that no wage group, will earn less 
than their expected marginal productivity, i.e. W2 t(i') ^ g '(Z )E t[x Ih^iO ')]- 
The actual rank i will only be observed by insiders. But the wage schedule is 
observable by outsiders. Also, any single worker can communicate his wage to 
outsiders. To prove Observation 1 under rank-order contracts, with any finite number 
of employees is difficult (even though it seems very plausible). However, in the limit, 
when the number of employees goes to infinity, we know that the rank-order contract is 
equivalent to a productivity contract. Thus, at least when number of employees is 
large we know that /3-types will mimic a-types unless the wage contracts is adjusted 
so as to achieve self-selection. Define U* to be the equilibrium utility an i-type can 
get under a separating rank-order contract. The maximization problem for finding the
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best separating a-contract now becomes;17
Max flja  = g(NaEa + Patf)E(&x 11] ) - Naw\a - Na ^  P(tf)wicti) (MP.3)
i=l i=l
Ca Na
£  ^ a ( 0w2a (i) + X  Ppcfffw
St. (3.a) U p* wl a + t l --------------- 1 + ^ a+1-----------
Ca N a
Z  Pa(i)»2a(‘) + X  ^ © v v
(3.b) U a < w i a + —   i=Ca+1
1 +r
(3.c) w2a(O Z g '(r)E a lx \w 2a(i')]
where Na is the number of people getting employed each period in a firm offering an 
a-contract. Condition (3.a) is the self-selection constraint, and (3.b) is the constraint 
that an a-type has to be paid at least as much in expectation in the firm as in another 
firm in the industry. Condition (3.c) is the constraint on the period 2 wage that is 
implied by competition in the labour market.
(3.a) will be binding since workers prefer flatter to steeper wage schedules and 
low cut-off ranks to high if ca< c*a . (3.b) will be binding since profit always can be 
increased by decreasing the wage. I have omitted the condition that an a-type should 
prefer an a-contract to an p-contract. As usual, it does not bind.
MLRP implies that Pa(0/Ppa(i) is decreasing in rank (see Appendix 3). An
a-worker, for a given expected wage payment, is indifferent between a contract which
give each worker different wages for different ranks, and a contract that give the same
17The reason why I now maximize profit instead of maximizing workers utility is that there is no longer 
constant returns to scale, i.e. Fiji = 0 will not hold in equilibrium.
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wage to more than one rank. On the other hand, /J-workers strictly prefer the latter 
(given an a-contract). This follows from (3.c) and the fact that P a (i)/Ppjii) is 
decreasing in rank. Thus, it is never optimal to give a-workers of different ranks the 
same wage.
Because P a (i)/P pa(i) decreasing in rank, condition (3.c) holds with 
equality for all /<1. Thus, we can state a parallel result to that of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4: Under rank order contracts; 
w2a(i') = Ea [x I i=n 
w2a(l)> E a [x\i= l]
The variables that are not determined are w ja , W2 tt(l) and ca , the cut-off 
rank. We can now differentiate Jljq with respect to ca to get (To get (8), (9) and 
(10) I use Proposition 4, the fact that (3.a) and (3.b) hold with equality, that 
Pa(i)=l/Na , and that g\Y)Ea [x I i = ca] - w2a (ca ) = 0.)
dlTja- N a ^ - P d  1)dca
dw2q
dca
dca (8)
Since
d wj q  | _  (w2 q(ca) ~ w)(PPckV) ~ PPaica))
dca V a ~ (1 - P ^ (l)N a )(l + r) (9)
and
dwiaO)^  U = [*2a(Ca)-^] aca u a
Nq(PpaLca)-Ppa( 1)) 
1 -P fic tW a
(10)
we have that
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rNaPpcfficd-Pfict D)
( l+ r X l - ^ o d W a )  J (11)
From this, it is easy to verify, the following result:
Proposition 3*: Under a rank-order contract, inefficient terminations are optimal if
This condition for termination of productive relationships is almost the same as (IT).
As in the previous section, where wages where function of productivity (and not 
of rank), we have the possibility that self-selection is achieved solely through ex post 
inefficient separation. But when it is achieved at least partially through steepening the 
wage schedule, the wage will be equal to average marginal productivity in period 2 
except for the first rank who earns a prize. The obtained wage schedule is thus similar 
to the one obtained in Rosen's (1986) study of elimination career ladders. In his 
model, the large first prize is nessesary to induce contestants to keep their effort at a 
high level, also late in the game. What I have shown here is that this wage schedule, 
which have been used as an explanation of top-executives' high wages, does not 
necessarily respond to a moral hazard problem but could result from adverse selection 
as well.
Can we use this framework to say anything about the relationship between firm 
size and workers'abilities? This is the question to which I now turn. Suppose that the 
production technology differs across firms. Then, the number of employees, N ,
and only if
P o - / r * \  I P n . n \
r
Proof : Use (11) and the fact that Poff) = 1 /Na- *
52
would differ across firms as well. Let's say that g=g(Y,K) where K is capital 
stock, and that g is increasing and concave both in Y and K. Clearly, a larger firm 
can have more ranks. Also, Pa(l)/Ppa(l) will be greater the larger is the firm. My 
conjecture is therefore that larger firms will have a comparative advantage in employing 
a-type s. The argument is that more ranks allow the payment in period 2 gets to be 
more precise, discouraging /3-workers, because of the MLRP. This is a new 
explanation for the positive correlation of wages and ability with firm size. For 
empirical evidence and a survey of other explanations see Brown and Medoff (1989).
The model can also be used to study how top wages will change with changes in 
the product demand during the contract period. Recall that all period 2 wages except 
the top wage are set to their minimum, and the period 1 wage to its maximum, given 
zero profit (on the margin) and the self-selection constraint. Thus, the period 1 wage 
and all wages below the top wage in period 2 will change when demand conditions 
change. If we assume that the state of demand is not verifiable, the top wage (which 
includes prize-money) can not be state dependent, since the firm would then always 
have an incentive to claim a bad demand state (or the state where the top wage is the 
smallest). Consequently, the top wage must be insensitive to the state of demand, and 
hence the difference between the the top-wage and "ordinary wages" will be larger in 
bad demand states.
5. Final remarks
The three most important results of this investigation is that 1) termination of
productive relationships may be used as a self-selection device, 2) that only the very
best worker should be overpaid, and 3) that large firms have an advantage in attracting
able workers. The second result hinges on the fact that workers are risk neutral. Had
they been risk averse, the level above which workers were overpaid may be dependent
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on the degree of risk aversion.
In conclusion, let me now relate the first result more closely to the existing 
literature. Following the work of Weiss (1980), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), there 
have been a number of attempts trying to explain why productive labour market 
relationships are sometimes terminated. The original ideas were twofold. In Weiss
(1980) the idea was that replying to a recession with a wage reduction would result in 
the most productive workers leaving the firm. Thus it would be better to keep the wage 
high and lay off workers randomly (the adverse selection argument). The second 
mechanism, presented by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), is that the threat of termination 
can induce higher effort by workers in a model where the employer can observe 
production but not effort (the effort inducement argument). Variations of this latter 
idea are recently presented by Kahn and Huberman (1988), Kahn and Mookheijee 
(1988) and Waldman (1990)1®. In their models, it is crucial that productivity is not 
verifiable. It is exacdy the provision that workers with a sub-standard productivity are 
not retained which ensures that the employer does not falsely claim that a worker has a 
low productivity. However, the robustness of this type of argument has been seriously 
questioned by Mookherjee (1986). The simple Stiglitz-Weiss model creates 
involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs for a range of plausible parameter 
values, and the more sophisticated model with two-sided uncertainty hinges on the 
assumption that the firm cannot use rank order tournaments. If the firm could commit 
to promoting a certain proportion of the work force, according to relative productivity, 
this would efficiently solve the incentive problems on both sides. ^  20
18 Other authors who have considered up-or-out contracts are OTlanery and Siow (1989). They are 
looking at hiring/firing policies when only experienced workers above a certain quality can supervise a 
new worker.
19 This critique can be circumvented by assuming that the firm must incur a small cost in order to 
observe the workers' productivity, and that the workers cannot know whether or not the firm promotes 
randomly. Personally, I am unimpressed by this counter argument: in most cases firms learn something 
about workers' abilities whether they want to or not Also, a firm with a random promotion policy 
would quickly earn a bad reputation.
20If application fees are allowed in the Stigliz-Weiss analysis the involuntary terminations would 
disappear. The reason why firing of productive workers can be rational is that workers are earning rents,
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My model is immune to the critiques levelled against the models founded on 
incentive effects. On the other hand, the model's applicability is restricted to 
environments where the time between hiring and re-evaluation is considerable. Thus, I 
have presented a new explanation of ex post inefficient tenure and promotion decisions 
in places where the true productivity is learnt slowly - whereas it is inconsistent with 
inefficient terminations occurring shortly after hiring and (random) firing of highly 
productive workers. Therefore, it is probably better seen as an attempt to explain up- 
or-out contracts in certain professions like art, science and law,21 than as a 
microeconomic foundation for Keynesian unemployment.
Although Guasch and Weiss (1981 p.278) hinted at the idea that termination 
threats may supplement wage profiles in sorting the work force, these authors never 
substantiated the argument and, as it stands it is incorrect. In this article, Guasch and 
Weiss analyse self-selection contracts both under the assumption of risk neutral 
workers and under the assumption that workers are risk averse, and they come to the 
conclusion that self-selection will always be optimal when workers are risk neutral, but 
not necessarily when they are risk averse. Throughout their paper they do however 
assume that self-selection implies that only those who pass the test will be hired. I 
show in Appendix 4 that if the workers are risk neutral, in their model all workers 
should be hired ex post. Only above a certain level of risk aversion can it be optimal to 
engage in inefficient firing. Again, of course, the intuition is that the steep wage 
schedule is costly - now due to workers' risk aversion - and it may be profitable to 
introduce a second self-selection device. But even with risk-aversion, it is necessary to 
have different reservation wages in order to produce the termination results in Guasch 
and Weiss' set-up. That was not necessary here.
Another important difference between the present model and Guasch and Weiss
due to efficiency wages. Thus, the threat to terminate induces higher effort However effort depend only 
on the difference between wage if successful and wage if failing. With risk neutral workers an application 
fee makes it possible for the firm to widen this difference without decreasing profit
21 Spurr (1987) reports that it takes an average of seven years before a trainee in a law firm is 
considered for being promoted to partner. Around 30% are then accepted for partnership.
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(1981) is that I allow for competition in the labour and product markets. In Guasch and 
Weiss (1980) and (1982), there is also competition in the labour and product markets, 
but ex post inefficient terminations are not optimal (even with different reservation 
wages). The reason terminations may be optimal in the present model is that there is 
asymmetric information between the firm which fire a worker and a firm which hire the 
same worker. Since a fired worker who is productive cannot be distinguished from 
other less productive workers, there is a net loss associated with having to leave the 
firm.
It is a key feature of my model that productivity as well as market conditions are 
learnt by both parties before layoffs. Thus, there is no asymmetry of information when 
the separation decision is made. Moreover, the results would go through even with 
costless renegotiation. Much other work on ex post inefficient layoffs, like that of 
Chari (1983), Hall and Lazear (1984), and Moore (1985) rely either on asymmetric 
information or costly renegotiation at the termination stage.22 Of these models only 
the latter allow for heterogeneous workers. However, as pointed out by Moore (1985) 
and Mookherjee (1986), they also tend to produce involuntary retentions rather than 
layoffs.
Finally, I would like to apologize for this article adding to the already much too
low facts/theory rate in this particular field. In order better to assess the relative merits
of various theories, micro level data on inefficient terminations would be very
welcome. The only indisputable example I am aware of where terminations of
productive relationships have been used as part of a conscious strategy to increase
overall efficiency, is from the Mongolian army under Ghengis Khan. There, a number
of Mongolian soldiers would be executed if one of their leaders was lost in fight. The
more prominent the leader, the higher was the number of soldiers punished. Although
this practice was obviously ex post inoptimal, it seems to have been ex ante efficient.
22 Here, I will not go into a detailed description of these models. The set of environments for which 
they are appropriate is sufficiently different from that studied here, that these theories are complementary 
to rather than competing with mine.
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Few armies have been more successful.
57
Appendix l 23
I will here show that MLRP implies that E a [x I w 2 «(*)] ^ 
Ep[x I w2a(*)]
Assumptions:
1) increasing in x (MLRP). x* R+ (A l.l)
J p ( x )
2) Let A be a subset of R+ such that I f a (x)dx > 0.
JA
Put,
L
I
x ft(x)dx
fi(x)dx
Et[x U  e A] =   (A1.2)
Proposition A l.l: Given assumption 1) and 2);
Ea[x \ x e A \ >  Ep[x I x e A ] .  (A1.3)
To prove proposition A l.l we will use the following lemma, which is proven 
afterwards;
Lemma A l.l:  Let h{x)t < x < <*>, be a probability density , i.e. h(x)>0 and
rI h(x)dx = 1 . Then it holds for u(x) and v(.x), -<*> < x  < <», which both are
J -o o
non-negative and increasing that;
u(x)v(x)h(x)dx | u(x)h(x)dx 11 | v(x)h(x)dx
to o  I to o  I I tc
I I I
J -o o  I J -o o  I \J-<
2*1 am grateful to Bengt Ros6n for help with this appendix and with appendix 3.
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Proof o f Proposition A l.l:  By (A1.2) we have that
Ifa(x)dx Ea[x I x  e A] = I xfa {x)dx = 'A JA
Hi fa(x) M x)fy x )  fI fffcx)dx 
JA
(A1.4)
(A 1.5)
Use the lemma A l.l with
v(x)
I
■a increasing by (A l.l)
u(x) = x mcreasing
^ I xfp(x)dx\ fa ( x ) d x l \  fp(x)dx = I f a (x)dx Ep[x I x  e A] (A1.6) 
JA JA JA JA
The claim in proposition A l.l now follows from (A 1.4) and (A 1.6)
Proof o f Lemma A l.l:
Step 1: It is readily checked that lemma A l.l holds for one-step functions (jumping 
from zero to one).
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Step 2: It is readily checked that if u(x) and v(x) are linear combinations of one-step
N N
functions ( u{x) = ^  avuv(x), v (jc) = ^  b^v^ix) ) lemma A l.l holds. 
v=l (p=l
Step 3: The claim in lemma A l.l now follows from that every non-negative, increasing 
function can be obtained as limes of a serie of increasing one-step functions.
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Appendix 2
Here I prove, in oppositing order, that a separating equilibrium in pure strategies 
exist for a sufficient high proportion of a-workers, and (ii) that there is no pooling 
equilibrium.
Expected profit given a pooling contract is;
[Jjp = jiEa + (1 -ji)Ep - wip + (x - w2p(x)) (pfa(x) + (l-p)fp(x)) dx (A2.1)
where fi is the proportion of a-types in the economy.
Proposition A2.1: No pooling equilibria in pure strategies exist.
Proof: Denote expected profit from an i-type in a poling contract Tipi. If n pa>0 
and n pp<0, /3-types can be profitably deterred from applying while a-types are still 
applying. This is brought about lowering w ip by k  and increasing w2p(m) by 
K(l+r)ya (m), leaving a-types utility unchanged but lowering that of the /3- 
types. If n pa<0 and Ilpp>0, it must be true that a wage group is paid more than 
their expected average productivity in period 2 and that a-workers have a higher 
probability of belonging to this wage group than do /3-workers. Denote these 
probabilities q a  and q p  respectively, a-workers can then be profitably deterred 
from applying, while /3-types still apply, if the relevant wage is lowered by K  and 
wlp is increased by q p K / ( l + r ) .  If n pa=TIpp=0y at least /3-types will prefer the 
separating wage schedule to the pooling, since this is the best wage schedule for /3- 
types given n pp=0. If instead of assuming productivity dependent wages in period 2, 
we had assumed rank order payments the proof is analogous. ♦
If however the proportion, //, of p -types in the economy is so small that \ - f i
m
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< rfa {m)/{\-\-r)\f(X(m) + fp(m)], it might be profitable for a firm to deviate from 
the separating equilibrium. We run into the standard difficulties with non-existence of 
equilibrium in pure strategies when the proportion of "bad" agents in the economy is 
small, see e.g. Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976). On the other hand, for 1 - / /  > 
rfa (m)/(l+r)\fa (m) +fp(m)]y no deviations from the separating equilibrium are 
profitable and hence an separating equilibrium exist. This can be shown as follows. 
Consider the pooling contract
where Hqa , w 2a(m) an(^ x ca takes the values of the best separating a-contract. 
Define W t to be the best separating wage schedule for an a-type. a-workers are 
indifferent between Wp and W a , and p-workers strictly prefer Wp to W 
Clearly, Wp is the best possible pooling contract if it is not possible to increase profit 
by transferring wage payments from period 1 to period 2 (reducing the period 2 wage is 
impossible because of competition in the labour market). We have that
Wp = { wip = wia +
(w2 a(m) - m)fa(m) - (x - w)fa(x)dx
1 + r
w2p(x)=x, xcp=w } (A2.2)
fa (x) fnfr\
- J IT  '  V x) (A2.3)
I f/ctC*) - f p W  < 0, then d n j p /  dw2p(x) < 0. If / « ( * )  - f p W  > 0, then 
d n jp ldw2p(x) < 0 iff Ifa (x)/(l+r) - f p (x)] /  [ f a M  ~fp(x )] < \L> The
62
expression  l /a U ) / ( l+ r )  - f p ( x ) ]  /  [ f a (x) -f p ( x )] is increasing in
f a (x)/fp(x). Therefore, dflj^dw^p^x) < 0 for all x  iff
fairn)
< fJ. (A2.4)1+r - W m}fa(rn) -fp(m)
Thus if (A2.4) holds, Wp is the best pooling wage schedule. It is straightforward to 
show that there exist fX <1, such that Wp is positive.
If [/a (m)/(l+r) - fp (m )] / [ f a (m) -fp(m)] > /i, then it will be profitable 
to raise some second period wage and lower w \ p until p -types are indifferent 
between the pooling contract and the separating contract. When both a-types and p- 
types are indifferent between the pooling contract and their first best separating 
contract, no further increases in the second period wage will be profitable since 
workers prefer flatter to steeper wage schedules. To see that this new pooling contract 
will be dominated by a separating contract, recall that Wp is the best wage contract for
p-types given non-negative profit on p-types and that Wa is the best wage contract 
for a-types given that p-types are indifferent between Wp and W a . Since W a 
and Wpare not the same, this pooling contract will give negative profit
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Appendix 3
f  fr') P (i)Here I will show that y  ? increasing in x  implies that a /; - is increasing in
jp\X) P p M
rank i.
Assumptions;
1) ^ 7^ - increasing in x (MLRP).
JpW
2) N  a-workers gets a (random) productivity result; by the
distribution f a (x) and one p-worker gets a productivity result Y  by the f p (x) 
distribution.
3) Let ip = the rank for a p-worker when one ranks the values X 1, X 2 ,..., X
Y  by size, staring with the largest.
The possible values of ip are 1,2,...^V+1.
Proposition A3.1: Ppa{ 1) < Ppcf2) <•••'<^/ja(N+l).
P (i)Corollary A3.1: - . is decreasing in rank, i.
Ppofj)
/=1, 2 N + 1
Proof of Corollary A l (given Proposition Al):
Ppa(i) + N P a (i) -  1. Thus, if P p a (i) is increasing in rank i, P a (i) is
p  /j \
decreasing in rank /, implying that *s decreasing in rank i. ♦
Proof o f Proposition A3.1:
a) given Y =  y ; X  j ,  X 2 ,—, X ^  are independent stochastic variables with the 
distribution f a(x).
b) Given Y  =y, the p-type is of rank i if N-i+l of X  j , X  2 ,..., X N are less than 
y and / -1 are greater than y.
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V 'I Y = y )  = U r + l )  f
\N-i  + 1|
fa(x)dx I
i - l
fa(x)dx
Ic) Ppcfi) = I Pf3a(i I Y  =y)fp(y)dy = (by (A3.1)) =
1-i +1,
f a (x)dx | [J f a (x)dx
I
i - l
fp (y )dy
We can rewrite (A3.2) on the following form;
p fia(') = L -i + llJ  h(y)G(y)dy
where
h(y) =/, 
where
N-i +1
fa(x)dx = -f//(y )dy
( py \N-i +2
f a M d x
J -  oo
and
G(y)=W)[jy fa(x)d*
(A3.1)
(A3.2)
(A3.3)
(A3.4)
(A3.5)
(A3.6)
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Partially integrating (A3.3) we get;
I. H(y}4-G(y)dydy H(yy^G(y)dy
(A3.7)
From (A3.6) we get
fy fH y ))  = - j f tM d x
4
1-2 4+ q(y)I j faOQdx i - l (A3.8)
where
q(y)=-4-dy Va(y) (A3.9)
q(y) < 0 by assumption 1).
Inserting (A3.5) and (A3.8) into (A3.7) we get
Ppcff)= L f +  J  f  ( f  I  (
J -o o  \  J -  o o  I \ J \
faOOdx
i -2
fp(y)dy
r /«(*><& (
/ v“ / + z;.oo J-oo \ k
N-i +2 ( foo \i -1
fa(x)dx\ q(y)dy (A3.10)
The first term in (A3.10) is equal to Ppa( i-1), thus
p Pofi) = ppcft- *> - D where D < 0. (A3.11)
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(A3.11) proves proposition A1. ♦
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Appendix 4.
I now show that the claim made by Guasch and Weiss (1981,p.278) that 
involuntary separations occur in their model is incorrect I stick to their terminology.
There are two types of workers, type 1 and type 2. Type 1 is more productive 
than type 2. Workers know their own type but prospective employers don't. The firm 
can charge an application fee and then test the applicants. The test is such that type 1 
have a higher probability of passing than type 2. To discourage type 2 workers from 
applying, they condition the wage/hiring decision on the test result. The test is costly to 
the firm. There is only one firm, which faces a concave production function. Price is 
given and independent of production. Guasch and Weiss consider both the case of risk 
neutral and the case of risk averse workers and come to the conclusion that self­
selection will always be optimal with risk neutral workers but not necessarily with risk 
averse.
Throughout the paper they assume that in self-selection contracts only those who 
pass the test will be hired. However, if the workers are risk neutral it is never optimal 
to do so. The optimal contract is to give those who fail the test their alternative wage 
and those who pass their alternative wage plus the application fee divided by the 
probability of passing. The application fee can still be chosen so that the low 
productivity types don't want to apply, and this scheme avoids turning able workers 
away because of a bad test result.
For a sufficiently high degree of risk aversion it might be optimal only to employ 
those who passed the test, but the authors do not consider the conditions under which 
this is so, they just - wrongly - assume that it always holds. To hire "failures" when 
employees are risk averse is more profitable the less risk averse they are, the higher is 
the firm's testing cost and the smaller is the difference in the reservation wages. 
Formally:
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Notation
A -  The cost of the test per applicant tested 
L -  the number of workers tested by the firm.
C— the fee charged by the firm to take the test
Pi= the probability of a type i worker passing the test
Ql= the expected labour input of type i workers
wf= the present value of the acceptance wage of a type i worker
w*= the present value of the wage offered by the firm to all workers passing the test.
Assumptions'. Q\>Qi^ w\>W2  andP\>P2 -
Minimum cost per efficiency unit of labour with a separating self-selection 
contract and when only those who pass the test are hired is
A+wiPi
~ n o T ~  <a 4 -d
If, however, those who fail the test are hired to a wage equal to w\ , the minimum cost 
per efficiency unit will be
g** A + w\
E -  Ql (A4.2)
It is easily seen that £**<£*. Thus, it is profitable also to hire those who fail the test. 
Now it is straightforward to show that E** can be achieved without violating either the 
participation constraint
Pxw* + (1 - P\)wx - C = wj (A4.3)
or the self-selection constraint
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Pl(w*) + (1 - ? 2 )w l - C < W 2 (A4.4)
The solution to this problem is any pair (C,w*) satisfying 
(I) vv* = wj + £ -
w  P1 -P 2
Obviously, since E**>E*, there exist some positive degree of risk aversion for which 
hiring of failures is profitable. Most importandy, if reservation wages are the same for 
both types of worker, inefficient terminations is never optimal, regardless of risk 
aversion. The reason is that workers who fail the test are indifferent between being 
retained or fired (since they are retained at their reservation wage), and so terminations 
can add nothing to what is already achieved by the upward sloping wage schedule.
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Chapter 3: A MATCHING MODEL OF DISCRIMINATION24
1. Introduction
Numerous studies have shown that women earn less than men and that black men 
earn less than white men. Moreover, in an overwhelming majority of these studies, the 
differential is not fully accounted for by differences in pre labour market conditions, 
such as education. According to Blau and Ferber (1987) there is typically an 
unexplained wage differential of 20% or more.
From a theoretical point of view, discrimination has proved to be an elusive 
phenomenon. The most cited work is Becker's (1971) taste models. There, the lower 
wages for women and blacks result from the employer, co-workers or consumers 
requiring a premium to interacting with these groups rather than a white man. 
However, as pointed out by Arrow (1973) and Cain (1986), Becker's model does not 
explain discrimination in the long run. It should disappear either through segregation - 
people belonging to a particular group interacting with each other - or, in the case of 
employer discrimination, through entry by employers without prejudices. The latter 
firms would be more profitable and hence drive the discriminating firms out of the 
market.
Another strand of literature, often referred to under the label of "statistical 
discrimination," has been developed by Lundberg and Startz (1983), following early 
work by Phelps (1972). These authors argue that workers whose expected 
productivity is the same may be treated differendy if one group's productivity is harder 
to measure. The impact on expected productivity, as measured by a potential employer, 
of a given investment in (invisible) human capital is smaller for the group whose ability 
is harder to measure, and therefore they will invest less. Also, as pointed out by
^Valuable comments and suggestions have been received from Daron Acemoglu, Tore Ellingsen, Alan 
Manning, Margret Meyer, John Moore and Asbjom R0dseth.
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Rothschild and Stiglitz (1982), if employers' payoff depends on how well they can 
match workers to tasks, the group whose productivity is easier to measure will be 
preferred even absent concerns for human capital investment. Other theories tracing 
discrimination to true differences in worker characteristics, are those of Bulow and 
Summers (1985) and Milgrom and Oster (1987). In Bulow and Summers' model 
workers with statistically lower turnover rates are better paid,25 whereas the valuable 
characteristic emphasized by Milgrom and Oster is a worker's visibility. Although 
visibility is not valued per se, market forces imply that a visible worker will be assigned 
in better accordance with his productivity and hence have a higher wage. The basic 
message in all these theories is that unequal treatment can be traced to some underlying 
characteristic, different from productivity itself. Thus, there is no discrimination in the 
sense that groups with exacdy the same (statistical) properties are treated differently.
A stricter definition of discrimination requires that workers who are identical in
all relevant respects, including turnover, measurability and visibility, obtain different
utilities. I will refer to this as strong discrimination. The first formal model capturing
this possibility is Spence (1976). There, workers signal their productivity through
education choice. The model has multiple equilibria, and it is possible therefore that the
return to education will differ across ex ante identical groups. However, it has been
argued that not all the equilibria in Spence's model are equally reasonable. Arguments
that one particular equilibrium (viz; the Pareto-dominating separating equilibrium) is
more reasonable than all of the others, have been put forward with increasing degree of
sophistication by Riley (1979), Cho and Kreps (1987) and Noldeke and van Damme
(1990) respectively. If this argument is accepted, it is easily verified that the model
loses its force in explaining discrimination. E.g., the "intuitive criterion" of Cho and
Kreps (1987) eliminates the possibility that one group, women in Spence's paper, does
not earn a return to education (are "pooled") whereas another identical group, men,
25 However, the premise that women have higher turnover than men, has been disputed. Even though 
women’s quit rates are higher than men’s, women's quit rates in any given type of occupation are not. 
Studies by Viscusi (1980), Blau and Kahn (1981) and by Harber, Lamas and Green (1983) demonstrate 
that, when wage differentials are controlled for, there is no difference in turnover due to gender.
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does earn such a return (are ’’separated").
An interesting early analysis of discrimination in a model with job search and 
incomplete information is McCall (1972). His model has the weakness, however, that 
firms' beliefs about the of workers' abilities are not correct, so discrimination is not an 
equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, McCall deserves much credit for directing 
attention away from friction-free Walrasian models to markets with a more realistic 
description of interaction between firms and workers.
Perhaps the most convincing current theory of strong discrimination is Akerlof 
(1985). Here, a significant subset of the consumers are discriminating (in Becker's 
sense), and in a search framework, sellers employing black workers are at a 
disadvantage. This drives down black workers' wages. A similar point is made by 
Boijas and Bronars (1989) in a model of self-employment.
The present paper neglects the consumer side altogether, focussing exclusively 
on labour market interactions. In addition, no employers have prejudices against any 
group of labour. Groups differ only by their index, i.e. their sex, colour, looks or 
other irrelevant label. Still, it is shown that, for any commonly known labelling of 
workers, there exist equilibria entailing discrimination. Men can have a higher lifetime 
utility than women, white can be better off than black, blue-eyed better off than brown- 
eyed, or vice versa. Even more surprising, only equilibria involving discrimination are 
stable.
Key assumptions of the model are:
(i) workers search for jobs, firms search for workers,
(ii) workers are not equally able at every job (but have the same average abilities)
(iii) firms can not observe a workers productivity perfectly until after he/she has 
been employed for some time,
(iv) workers have some private information about their productivity in any specific
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job before they start working, and
(v) both profit and wages increase as the quality of the match increases (the 
productivity of the worker in that particular job).
In short, the idea of the paper can be described as follows. When a group of 
workers finds it difficult to get a job, workers belonging to this group will respond by 
applying for more jobs. As they start applying for jobs that they are not particularly 
well suited for, the average quality of applicants from this group is reduced, which in 
turn makes firms more reluctant to hire them. Thus, if some firm discriminates against 
this group (black, women or long term unemployed), it is rational for every other firm 
to do so too. Note, that no firm need to have a taste for discrimination in Becker's 
sense. Discrimination arises in a non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium even if 
everybody knows that the groups are inherently equal.
The model is shown to be consistent with differential wages as well as 
unemployment rates. Furthermore, it is consistent both with discriminated groups 
being less well matched and being allocated to less attractive jobs. Another prediction 
is that observed skills of discriminated workers have to be significantly higher than 
those of other workers in order for the former to be preferred by an employer.
The theory offers an argument for affirmative action at the hiring stage in the 
public sector. Favouring the discriminated group in this way will move the whole 
economy to a less discriminating equilibrium.
We know that exit rates from unemployment falls with duration of 
unemployment. The model also offers a new explanation of this phenomenon.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 ,1 go through the basic model 
under the simplifying assumption that no information about workers, except their 
colour, is available to the firm. Section 3 studies, in this prototype model, the effects 
of discrimination on unemployment and duration dependency in exit rates from 
unemployment. A more sophisticated version of the model, where firms can test 
applicants before making a hiring decision, is introduced in section 4. Finally, section
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5 offers some concluding comments.
2. The Model
Firms with unfilled vacancies search for workers, and unemployed workers 
search for a job. Open vacancies are announced, and with them a starting wage. Each 
vacancy has a pre-determined closing time. After the closing time, the firm chooses 
among the applicants the worker on which they expect to earn the highest profit.2** 
All workers have the same distribution of abilities over all jobs in the economy, but 
they are not equally able in every job. In other words, they have different comparative 
advantages. Moreover, an important assumption is that workers have private 
information about their ability.
Formally, let q be the per period value of a match between a worker and a firm. 
For any job match, q is a random drawing from a p.d.f.,f(q). This distribution 
function is assumed to be the same for all firms and workers. Variations in 
productivities exist because matches are of different quality, and not because of intrinsic 
variations in skills or technologies. (I relax this assumption later). The firms must pay 
a training cost of K  to make use of a new worker. When a worker applies, he has 
some private information about the quality of the match. To simplify, I will assume 
that they know their productivity <7, with certainty. Only after the worker has been in 
the firm for one period, does the firm learn the productivity. This initial period is 
referred to as stage 1, and the periods thereafter constitute stage 2. The relative 
duration of the two stages does not play a role in the analysis. When a firm announces 
a vacancy, it also announces an initial wage, uq , and for simplicity this is equal to
pg
For another search model with multiple applications and ranking among the applicants, see 
Blanchard and Diamond (1990). Empirical evidence on the number of applications per vacancy and 
details on firms' hiring procedures is given by Barron and Bishop (1985), Barron, Bishop and 
Duncelberg (1985), Meager and Metcalf (1987), Holzer, Katz and Krueger (1988) and Krueger (1988).
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zero. At stage 2, a new per period wage, w2, is negotiated. Contrary to Wj, this 
wage is not independent of productivity. Each period at stage 2 the firm has a net profit 
of q -W2-
Workers and firms are infinitely lived and have a common discount rate r. In 
each period there is an exogenous probability of separation, s. At stage 2 when the 
productivity, <7, is known to both parties, I assume that the wage is determined by the 
Nash bargaining solution. Both the firm and the worker has bargaining power since 
the labour market is not frictionless, also the firm must invest K  to replace the 
incumbent worker.27 The separation rate, st is assumed to be the same regardless of 
whether the two parties are bargaining or have reached an agreement
The analysis of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) is applied in choosing 
the appropriate disagreement points. These are what each party would get while 
bargaining and not, as is often used, the outside option. The latter (which for the 
worker is the value of being unemployed and for the firm the value of a vacancy) only 
constitute a minimum pay-off to the respective parties.28 While bargaining, I assume 
that the worker gets his first stage wage, wj , (which I have assumed to be equal to 
zero) and that he produces q \  where q'<q. For simplicity q' is set equal to zero.
The sequence of events are illustrated in Figure 1.
firms q known,
announce wage bargain,
vacancies separation ? separation ? separation ?
1 2  3 4
hiring end of period end of period end of period
payment payment payment
Figure 1
27 The model has many similar features to Pissarides (1984,1985), with stochastic job matching, 
wage determination through bargaining and endogenous determination of workers' reservation wages.
The main difference is the assumption of incomplete information at the hiring stage.
28Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989) found in an experiment that this specification did significantly 
better than the conventional, and logically incorrect, approach to disagreement points.
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We can now formalize the bargaining problem. The second stage wage is 
determined by29,30
M axQ=(q-W 2  )PW2 ^~P (MP. 1)
*2
st: h>2 £ rU 
<7 - W2 > rV
where U is the expected lifetime utility when unemployed, and V the expected value 
of vacancy. By multiplying U and V with r we get the per period value of the 
outside options. Solving (MP.l) we get
w2 = (1 -P) q (1)
Th = Pq (2)
We see that both wages and profit are increasing functions of q. This is nessesary for 
my results to go through. Both the firm and the worker will get more than their 
respective outside option, so the outside options are non-binding constraints. A 
worker's outside option is the value of being unemployed, which by the assumption 
that ^ = 0 ,  is less than what he will get in any job that he has accepted.31 The 
outside option for the firm is the value of a vacancy, which in equilibrium will be zero.
2^ I have implicitly assumed that the worker is indifferent between producing q and q'. This 
simplification does not affect any of the results.
30The probability of separation, s, will not effect the outcomes since it is assumed to be exogenous and 
the same during agreement and bargain.
31A sufficient condition for a worker not to accept a job that yield a stage 2 utility less than the 
unemployment payoff is that w] <w2 • Recall that a worker can predict w>2 perfectly at the time of 
hiring.
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The key to the model is the insight that workers will accept worse matches when 
their probability of being selected for a job decreases. This is what I will now show. 
On the job search is not permitted. While simplifying the analysis, the latter can be 
endogenized by, e.g., introducing a cost of changing jobs. Total value to a worker in a 
match of quality q at the beginning of stage 1, J(q), is then
m  = 0 )
where R(q) is equal to the total value to a worker who is in a match of quality <7, at 
stage 2. Using (1) we get:
= (l-s)(l-p)q + (1 -s)R(q) + ^= ^  + Jiz. (4)
1 +r 1+r 1+r
which gives that
(W X l-ftg  + sU
w  (l+r)(r+i)
Using (2) we find the expression for expected total profit, E[YI\, in the same way :
m . a i i . y *  m
1+r (l+r)(r+5)
The expected value of opening a vacancy, V is
_ yEXm  j _  (7)
1+r 1+r
where yis the probability the vacancy is filled and I  the per period cost of an open
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vacancy. In equilibrium V=0, thus
= /  (8)
Job announcements arrives to the worker at a rate (p. The worker then makes 
the decision whether to apply or not. I assume that workers do not apply for jobs they 
will not accept if offered to them. (A small application cost would imply this.) A 
worker is more inclined to apply the higher he expects the second stage wage to be. 
Consequently, he selects a cut off rate qc, above which he applies and below which he 
does not. Thus, the arrival rate of jobs that a worker applies for is, 0[1- 
F(qc)]=HQc)‘ The value of being unemployed is then
v  = pHqc)E[J 1 Qc] + [1 - p A jg d W  /9)
1+r 1+r
where p  is the probability that a worker gets a job given he applies and E[/I#c] is the 
expected value to a worker given that he gets a job and that qc is his cut off rate. 
Rearranging, we get
U = U(p,qc) = (10)
r+pMqd
from which it follows that the value of being unemployed is increasing in the 
acceptance probability, p:
dU_ = rMqd)E[J I > Q ^
dp (r+pUqd)2
It is also straightforward to check that a worker's productivity in the job that he is just 
willing to accept, qc, is increasing in p. The optimal cut-off level qc, is defined by
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The second order condition is assumed to be satisfied.^2 A worker applies for all jobs 
that gives a higher or equal value to the value of being unemployed. Thus, qc is also 
defined by
/ to )  = tfto*rt (13)
Using (5) and (13) we get
r(l+r + s)U /1ylxQc=  --------- —  (14)
(1-*)(1-JS>
from (11), (12) and (14) we then get
= rd-t-w ) dU >Q (15)
°p °P
Thus, if the acceptance probability, p, falls, the acceptance quality, qc, will fall.
With this result in hand, the main insight is easily derived. Let there be two 
types of workers; black and white. The distribution function over different matches 
f(q) are the same for all black and all white workers. The firms' hiring strategy is a 
rule for selecting between the applicants. This could be random or weighted in favour 
of one of the two groups. In the extreme case, the ranking of applicants is strictly in 
terms of colour. Let the resulting hiring probabilities be denoted p B and p w 
respectively. Let any combination of hiring rules which implies that Pb~Pw on 
average be denoted a neutral policy. (An example of neutral policy is when all firms
32|^<0 at ^  = 0<=> - <0dqt oqc aqc dcfr
hire at random.) Any other policy is discriminating. The extreme case where all firms 
only employ blacks (whites) if there is no white (black) applicants are referred to as 
completely discriminating. I assume that it is always profitable for the firm to hire one 
of the applicants if there are any.
Proposition 1: In the model where only colour is observable, there are two types of 
hiring equilibria; neutral and completely discriminating.
Proof: (i) Existence: see appendix 1. (ii) Incomplete discrimination is not an 
equilibrium. Suppose p w>Ps on average. Then by (15) we get qcw > qCR. This 
means that expected productivity of whites is higher than expected productivity for 
blacks therefore all firms prefer to hire whites to blacks. ♦
Let me first present the intuition for why a neutral hiring strategy is an equilibrium. 
This strategy impliesPg=pw and hence that qcB=qcw. Consequently, both types of 
applicant have the same expected productivity, and any hiring strategy is optimal, 
including the neutral. Similarly, the intuition behind the completely discriminating 
equilibrium is the following. Suppose all firms hire black workers if and only if there 
is no white applicant. Then Pb <Pw > anc* by 0 ^ ) QcB<(Icw • TMS means that the 
expected productivity of a black applicant is lower than that of a white, confirming that 
complete discrimination is rational.
Obviously, in a discriminating equilibrium, black workers earn a lower average 
wage than do white workers. This is because on average they are not matched as well, 
so that u>2 is lower.
Another interesting observation is that only the completely discriminating 
equilibrium is stable. In other words, discrimination is the strong prediction of the 
model, not only a possible case.
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Proposition 2: Only completely discriminating equilibria are stable.
Proof: Any deviation from the neutral equilibrium implies that and therefore
all firms will discriminate by the logic of part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 1. But 
by the same reasoning, a small deviation from the completely discriminating 
equilibrium does not influence the hiring incentives of firms. ♦
In order to check the robustness of the results, it is desirable to relax some of the 
assumptions of this simple model. In appendix 2 ,1 show that introduction of (small) 
application costs does not affect the results. A more interesting question is whether 
discrimination disappears if the firms can observe some noisy signal of workers' 
productivity. Section 4 shows that this is not the case. On the contrary, allowing firms 
to test workers expands the set of interesting predictions generated by the model. 
Thus, I feel justified in performing some further analysis within the simple framework. 
First, however, let me discuss in some more detail the assumption that profit increases 
with quality of the match.
One may ask why firms do not adjust the first period wage in such a way that 
they become indifferent between hiring black and white applicants. Here, this would 
mean that the firm required a large fee in order to hire black workers. This issue is 
related to the bonding critique of efficiency wage models, see Carmichael (1985).
Two reasons why the first period wage cannot be manipulated so as to make the 
firm indifferent between applicants is that it may be infeasible to make a sufficiently 
detailed announcement (a hiring decision typically have many dimensions - the quality 
of the applicant being determined also by factors which are hard for the employer to 
formulate in advance), and that explicit discrimination may be prohibited by law.
At any rate, empirical evidence strongly suggests that firms condition their hiring 
decision on observable variables such as unemployment duration, work experience and 
other qualifications. The probability of a job offer is decreasing in the duration of 
unemployment and increasing in qualifications (see Meager and Metcalf (1987) and
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Krueger (1988)). Also, the work by Holzer (1987) and Lynch (1989) confirms that 
blacks have a significandy lower job offer probability than do whites, i.e. Pg<pw.
I now turn to an issue which is often brought up in discussions about 
discrimination, namely that of unemployment
It is well known that unemployment rates are substantially higher for black 
workers than for white with similar characteristics (see Rees (1986) and Pissarides and 
Wadsworth (1990)). It is also established that this is mainly due to the duration rather 
than the number of unemployment spells (see eg Clark and Summers (1982)). It is 
interesting to see whether the present model is consistent with this fact. Thus, let us 
investigate how unemployment rates changes with the probability of getting a job. If 
unemployment is negatively related to p, the model is consistent with higher 
unemployment rates for discriminated workers.
The exit rate from unemployment, z, is
3. Discrimination and unemployment
2 =pX(qc) (16)
Clearly,
Now,
d(p[l’ F{qJ\)
dp (17)
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Thus, we have two effects of a change in p :
1) 1 - F(qc) : For a given cut-off productivity, exit rates increase as acceptance 
probability increases. (+)
increases, i.e. the workers make fewer applications. (-)
Therefore, pB< pw implies that black workers have higher unemployment rates than 
whites if and only if
In other words, (Cl) is both necessary and sufficient for lower acceptance probability 
to induce lower exit rates, and hence higher unemployment rates. It is not possible to 
sign the left hand side of (Cl) for general functional forms. The ambiguity of the sign 
of unemployment as a response to changes in vacancies, was noted by Barron (1975). 
The number of vacancies is here described by the parameter 0. Since the sign of 
d<f>[ 1 - F(qc)] / d(/> is the same as the sign of d(p[ 1 - F(qc)])/dp, Barrens analysis 
is direcdy applicable to my model. Burdett (1981) has investigated conditions on f(q) 
(under the assumption of zero separation rate, i.e. s= 0) for exit rates from 
unemployment to rise as the number of vacancies falls. However, the class of 
functions which is found to have the desired property is not large enough to be 
convincing on a priori grounds that unemployment will decrease with p.
But, although it is not possible theoretically to exclude the possibility that d<p[ 1 - 
F(qc)] /  d(f> is negative, the empirical studies by Barron (1975), Pissarides (1986), 
Jackman and Layard (1991) strongly suggests that it is positive. Thus, the empirical 
fact that exit rates fall as the number of vacancies falls implies that discriminated
-,N JF(ad dqc .
d p ' When acceptance probability increases, optimal cut-off productivity
(Cl)
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workers have higher unemployment rates in the present model.
A well established empirical regularity is that the exit rate falls with the duration 
of employment (see e.g. Johnson and Layard (1986)). Either this must stem from 
heterogeneity among workers (some have low exit rates others high), or from true 
duration dependence. True duration dependence is typically associated with loss of 
skills or with disillusion and less intensive job search (see e.g. Jackman et. al. (1991), 
chapter 5). Lockwood (1991) shows that it can also occur if workers differ in abilities, 
and abilities are not perfectly observable to an employer. The employer will then take 
unemployment duration as a signal of low ability, since a long term unemployed has 
failed to be hired by many other employers.
Empirical studies have tried to distinguish between heterogeneity and true 
duration dependency. Although the results are somewhat mixed, true duration 
dependency seems to exists. 33
My model offers a new explanation for true duration dependency. Evidence of 
firms' hiring procedures shows that firms are reluctant to hire long term unemployed. 
The probability of being interviewed and obtaining employment decreases with the 
duration of unemployment spells.34 If workers find it more difficult to get a job 
(given that they apply) as the duration of their unemployment spell increases, they will 
lower their reservation wage (and hence their productivity). This implies that the firms 
rationally believe the average quality of an applicant to decrease as unemployment 
durations increases, even without loss of skills, or sorting. This can be stated briefly 
as follows. Define the value of being unemployed for a worker with a unemployment 
spell of t as:
r r ^ _ P t^ - F i q d W J \ q ^  , [ l -P /0 t l -F (^ ] ] f / ,+i
m  Wr + ------------^  (is)
33 See eg. Nickell (1979), Heckman and Borjas (1980), Lynch (1985), Blanchard and Diamond 
(1989) and Jackman and Layard (1991).
34 See Meager and Metcalf (1987). For another model that assumes that firms condition hiring decisions 
on duration of unemployment see Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
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with probability p t<j>[ 1 - F(qc)] the unemployed finds a job and with probability 
1- p t<f>[ 1 - F(qc)] he stays unemployed. If the hiring probability falls with duration, 
ie if p t > p t+i ( z*>0) then the value of being unemployed will fall with duration, i.e. 
U(t) > U(t+i), which in turn leads the cut-off productivity qc to fall with duration. 
Given condition (Cl), it follows that exit rates falls with duration. Thus, the model 
suggests that we can find duration dependency even without loss of skills, 
discouragement or sorting.
So far, I have made the unrealistic assumption that firms are unable to make any 
judgement about specific applicants. I now allow firms to test (interview) workers. 
The test is assumed to be unbiased but not perfect. Empirical studies have shown that 
firms rarely interview all applicants (see eg. Barron and Bishop (1985), Barron, 
Bishop and Dunkelberg and Meager and Metcalf (1987)). They first make a short-list 
of applicants they will interview (test). Since profit is assumed to be linear in q, and 
firms risk neutral, the firms' hiring decision will only depend on E[q]. The expected 
value of <7, given a test result m' is
4. Extension: Firms can test workers
E[q\m’] =
qgirri I q)Kq)dq
(19)
g(m' I q)f(q)dq
where g( • I q) is the density function of m given q. Taking the first derivative with
respect to qc we get
g(m' I qcVlQc) I (q - qdg(m' I q)f(q)dq
dE[q lm'] __________ h e __________________
&lc I ^oo ' 2
g(m' I q)f(q)dqf
[JQc
> 0 (20)
In words, the expected value of q for a given m, increases with qc.
I will assume that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) holds, i.e.
g(m1" \ g) *S *ncreas*n& *n Q ^  MLRP implies that E[q\m] is increasing in
»»> 35171.
Completely discriminating short-listing will refer to the situation where no firm 
puts a black (white) on the short-list if there are some white (black) applicants that are 
not on the short-list. Clearly, there are now two ways in which a class of workers can 
be discriminated against; in the short-listing decision and in the choice between short­
listed candidates.
Proposition 3: (i) Any stable equilibrium is completely discriminating, (ii) In a 
stable equilibrium, a black worker who is short-listed together with a white, will have 
to score significantly better in order to get hired.
Proof: (i) I first show that incomplete discrimination is not an equilibrium. By 
definition, a discriminating equilibrium entails qcw * q cB. If qcw> qCB> it implies 
that the expected productivity of a white worker is higher than that of a black. 
Consequently, black applicants should be shortlisted only if all white applicants are 
short-listed. The stability argument is the same as in the proof of Proposition 2. (ii) 
follows from (20) and that dE[q I m\/dm > 0. ♦
35MLRP hold for example when the density function g( • I q) is normal, poisson or uniform. For a 
fuller discussion, see Milgrom (1981).
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The novel feature of this proposition is the prediction that discriminated groups have to 
score higher (do better on the interview) in order to be chosen.36 There is some 
empirical evidence that this is true. E.g., Cross et al (1990) found in an experiment that 
compared to equally qualified anglo looking Americans, hispanic looking Americans 
had a lower probability of getting a job given that they got to an interview. They were 
also less likely to get to the interview.
The fact that U goes down means that the expected value of a job, and/or the 
unemployment rate, goes down. Both are not necessarily worsened. Thus, it is 
possible to construct examples where the average wages of blacks will be higher than 
the average wages of whites, even though the white workers obtains a higher lifetime 
utility. In part this is due to the assumed homogeneity of the labour market. If we 
assume instead that some jobs are more attractive than others, it is very likely that 
discrimination will hurt along both dimensions.37 Attractive jobs with high average 
productivity will have more applicants. Therefore blacks will constitute a higher 
proportion in the jobs with low average productivity. Thus, even if it is possible that 
black workers earn the same or even more than whites given a specific job, there will 
be a tendency that their average wage is lower due to them being over represented in 
"bad" jobs. Extended in this way, the model opens up the possibility that within a 
narrow job category wages will be the same for black and white and for men and 
women, but average wages will differ due to differences in proportions across jobs. 
So even though gender and racial wage differentials are relatively small when 
occupations are narrowly defined (see eg. Cain (1986) or Blau and Ferber (1987)), this 
is not reliable evidence that discrimination is negligible.
I have not compared the efficiency of different equilibria. However, there are
36 Note that the model does not necessarily imply that discriminated groups will have better visible 
qualifications in any given job. It only implies that when a woman competes with a man (or a black with 
a white) she will have to have better visible qualifications in order to be employed.
37 For evidence of the existence of good and bad jobs, see the literature on inter industry wage 
differentials (eg. Kruger and Summers (1988)).
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other reasons, such as fairness, for disliking discriminatory equilibria. If so, the 
present model offers a strong case for affirmative action at the hiring stage. Note in 
particular that equal treatment in one sector will improve the situation for the on average 
discriminated group also in other sectors. If for example the public sector favours 
blacks and women at the hiring stage, these groups would find it easier to get a job also 
in the private sector. Although it would still be hard to get on the short-list, the test- 
requirements would be weaker. (Because qc is increasing in p, they can do worse on 
the test an still be employed.)
5. Concluding remarks
To sum up, it has been shown that discrimination is the unique (type of) stable 
equilibrium in a model where no one has prejudices. There is no tendency towards 
segregation (as in Becker (1971), Lang (1986) and Milgrom and Oster (1987)). Nor is 
there any scope for profitable takeovers as in Becker's model. The model is consistent 
with many empirical phenomena, including lower wage, higher unemployment, and a 
higher proportion of blacks and women in bad jobs. An interesting implication of the 
model is that affirmative action in one sector also serves to reduce discrimination in 
other sectors. Finally, the paper makes two methodological points. First, equal 
treatment within narrowly defined occupations does not rule out discrimination. 
Second, it is important to look at hiring procedures and not only at wages when 
studying discrimination.
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Appendix 1: Existence of equilibria
Here I will show the existence of equilibria. The notation is as in the main text
and,
Lt-: Number of workers of colour i (exogenous)
D f Number of employed workers of colour i
Xf. Number of unemployed workers of colour i.
//, : Number of hiring, of workers of colour i.
M: Number of vacancies
t: time index
_ U q ci)Xi 
a i~ M 
ie{WJ3)
In steady state the following must hold;
Xiit+l^Xiit)
Hfr+D-Hiit)
i.e. the numbers of unemployed, Xit hirings, //,*, and employed workers, D/, of 
colour i are the same each period. Furthermore, in steady state the number of workers 
of colour i who are hired has to be equal to the number of separation of workers of 
colour i. This yields the steady state hiring condition;
Hi = sDi (A 1.4)
The following identities are also true;
Li-Df+Xi (A 1.5)
(A l.l) 
(A 1.2) 
(A 1.3)
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X i i t + l M l - P i H q d W i i t )  + sDi(t) (A1.6)
(A 1.5) says that number of workers of colour i is equal to number of employed plus 
unemployed workers of colour i. (A 1.6) says that number of unemployed workers at 
the beginning of period f+1 is equal to number of unemployed workers at t multiplied 
with 1 minus the probability of finding a job, plus the number of separations at time r, 
Using the four steady state conditions; (A l.l), (A1.2), (A1.3) and (A1.4) and 
the unemployment identity; (A 1.6) we get the steady state unemployment equation;
^ _ _ sD’i _ s(Lj - Xj) _  sLj  ^  j yj
pMQci) PiKQci) s+PiM.qci)
The number of vacancies in the economy, A/, is determined by the zero profit 
condition (equation (8) in the main text).
From equation (15) we know that qc is a continuous increasing function of p . 
Thus, the optimal cut-off equation can be written
where / is continuous and increasing, and /(l) = qc* < ®°. Since J{qc{) = Ui in 
equilibrium, and £/,-=0 if p/=0, we know that 1(0) = 0. To ensure existence of 
equilibria I will make two further assumptions. The first one is that (Cl) in the main 
text is satisfied i.e.,
y£[n\ -  I (A1.8)
<7d=/(Pi) (A1.9)
AssumptionAl: >o
4>i
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Let P(7]z=c) denote the probability that a vacancy has c applicants of colour i. 
When Mqci)Xi and M are large c is approximately poisson distributed, i.e.,
p (»?,=c) = j ( a i . i o)
Consider now the case where whites are favoured. The number of white hirings, Hw 
is equal to number of vacancies that have at least one white applicant, i.e.,
HW = M( 1- e ~ai) (A l.ll)
On the other hand, HB is equal to the number of vacancies that have no white 
applicants and at least one black applicant;
Hb =Me ~aw (1 - e ~aB) (A1.12)
(A l.ll) and (A 1.12) allow us to get expressions forpw andpB.
pw  = J _ ( i . e -«w) (A1.13)
A'(Qcw)X w w
pB = — = ^ ( l ( A 1 . 1 4 )  
MQcb)Xb aB
Equilibrium is defined by (A 1.5); the steady state hiring identity, (A 1.7); the 
steady state unemployment equation, (A 1.8); the zero profit condition, (A1.9); the 
optimal cut-off equation and (A 1.13) and (A 1.14); the two acceptance probability 
equations. The unknown variables are qci, X / , D ^  and M. For simplicity I
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assume that <j> is a given constant.
The existence proof contains two steps:
1) I show that (A 1.7), (A 1.9), (A 1.13) and (A 1.14) imply that qci , /?, and Xi can be 
described as continuous functions of M and exogenous variables.
2) I show that (A 1.8) yields a solution for M  and (A 1.5) yields a solution forD,-.
Step 1;
Inserting (A 1.9) into (A 1.13) we get
pw=kw(Mj> WJCW) = (A1.15)
kw is a continuous function of A/, Xw, p w and exogenous variables. Taking the first 
derivatives of kw, with respect to A/, Xw and pw we get
where
_ X (q Cw )X w  _  [^1 ~  F (l(P w ))V tw  
M ~ M
(A1.16)
(A1.17)
a^w _~dX(c[cw) \ (l - > 0 (A1.18)
dpw dpw OyM.qcw)
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By Assumption Al,
dpJUflcw) >Q=;> U n )  + pw > 0
“Pw “Pw
dk(qCw) 1 ^ 1
A<?cw) Pw
;> _ ^ c w ,  _ i— <_!_ (A1.19)
Thus,
<  — - — ( l  -  e -0 ^  -  c t w e ^ v v )  =  ---------1--------- ( l  -  e ^ w  -  <  l
dpw «wPw (1 -e«w)
dkSince k w(M ,0,X H,)> 0, ^ ( M ,1 ,X W) < 1, < 1 and kw{M ,pw,X w) is
“Pw
continuous in its arguments, we know that (A 1.9) and (A 1.13) gives pw as a 
continuous functions of Xw and Af.
Let Yw= sXw + X wp wX(qcw). From (A1.7) we then get; Yw(Xw)=sLw, 
and hence
d Y w _  „ , \<$Xwpw t v  _ dX(qCw) dqCw dpw  / a 1 on\
5 TT-  -  J  +  M qcw)—^ ? —  + A h P w t-t- 5 —  tAOA.W OAw oqcw OPw OAw
Further,
=n,v + x J P w =  e-“ w > 0 (A1.21)
a x w "Pw " wd x w
and
dX(qCw) dqcw dpw > q  ( A l  2 2 )
dqCw dpw dXw
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r)Y riY
Thus 5tt^>  0. Using that 377^  > 0, yw(0)=0, and that Yw -> <*> as X w -> «>, weUAyy (/A|y
know that (A1.7) gives Xw as a continuous function of M. Thus, qcw, p w and X w 
are continuous functions of M.
Analogously,
= a# ^  C  ^ (A 1.23)
docNoting that 0 < e"a w <1 and that < 0, we similarly establish kB(M,0yXBtaw) 
>0, kB(M ,\ ,X B,a w) < 1, >0, ^ < 1 ,  <0. Consequently, (A1.7),
(A 1.9) and (A 1.15) define <7C^ , and XB as continuous functions of M.
Step 2:
I now show that that the zero profit condition , (A 1.8) solves M.
/= )£ [ /H  (A1.8)
Clearly,
yE[n\ = (l-Q~aw)E[n\ q= qcw\ + e -M  1 - r<*B)E[n qc= qcB] (A1.24)
Thus yE[II] is a continuous functions of q^ X i and M . Since and X,- are 
continuous functions of M, yE[IJ\ is a continuous function of M.
Assumption A2: Af=0 is not an equilibrium, i.e. E[I7\ qci~0] > /
Assumption A2 is a sufficient (but not necessary) assumption for there to exist a M
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such that yE[TI\ < / .  As M-> °o, qci -> qci*, and yE[IT\ -> 0. As M-> 0, qci 
-> 0 and yE[TI\ -> E[IT\ qci =0]. This, together with Assumption A2 imply that 
(A 1.8) has at least one solution to M. Without making further assumptions we can not 
exclude the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Obviously, for a given X -, (A 1.5) solves D,-.
Since p w > pB by the above hiring rule, also qcw > q cB (by (A1.9)), 
confirming that the hiring rule is optimal.
The proof that there exists a neutral equilibrium is analogous.
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Appendix 2: Application Cost 
I will now consider the sensitivity of the model to the assumption of zero 
application cost (pecuniary or non-pecuniary). The worker has to be indifferent 
between the value of being unemployed and the expected value from applying for a job 
of value qc . Thus, with a positive application cost, A, qc is defined by
pj(qc) - A + {\-p)U{qcp A )  = U{qc,pA) (A2.1)
This is the analog to (13) in the main text. (A2.1) simplifies to
J(qc) = U(qcJ> A)+ j- (A2.1')
Using (5) in the main text and (A2.T) we get
/i A(r+s)(\+r)r(l + r + s)U + ^
Qc= --------------------------------------
a-m-P)
thus,
4 (m )(l+ r)  > Q
dp dp p*
The value of being unemployed is now (the analog to (10) in the main text),
u =  pM qc)E U 1 <tc\ - AX{qc)
r+ pK qd
(A2.2)
(A2.3)
(A2.4)
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For my results to hold, cut-off productivities, qc, has to fall as p  falls, i.e. >0.dp
daUsing (A.3) and (A.4), we get the following condition for > 0
E[J IgJ > (r+.s)(l+r)(r +pX(q^2 - rjl+r+s)p2?^q^2 A^2 ^
A/P rlpMqd(l+r+s)
where, E[J I qc\ is the expected lifetime earnings, given that one has a job and A/p 
is the expected total application cost before getting a job. For small enough values of 
r, (A2.5) will not hold. As r goes to zero, the right hand side goes to infinity.
If (A2.5) doesn't hold, it implies that as the probability of getting a job goes 
down, the workers will increase their cut-off. Consequently, in bad times, when the 
number of applications per vacancy is high, workers should be more choosy. 
Conversely, if it can be established that workers apply less critically in bad times, 
application costs do not represent a problem to the present analysis.
Also, even if A was sufficiently high in some jobs, so that (A2.5) did not hold 
for these, this would not bring the economy all the way to a neutral equilibrium. In 
jobs where (A2.5) doesn't hold optimal hiring procedures is neutral, but where (A2.5) 
hold they are discriminating.
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Addendum to Chapter 1
In chapter 1,1 have characterized the solution to the Nash bargaining problem
Max X = (/7-/7o)0(Z-Zo) st. e=e2, N(w,e) (15)
w
by its first order condition, thus implicitly assuming that the second order condition 
is satisfied. (Interiority is ensured by mild technical restrictions.)
I now give the steps leading to the conclusion that wage and effort is positively 
related at this interior solution, and we consider the region above the contract curve.
„ .. ax . d2x  . az .Step 1) ^— = 0 ,  < 0 => =— > 0.dw 0W2 dw
Step 1) follows straight forward from (17), (11) and the fact that (77-/Iq) and 
(Z-Zq) are greater than zero when X  is maximized.
3ZStep 2) From (11) it follows that; =— > 0 <=> u'(w)w - er > 0.dw
Step 3) Above the contract curve u'(w)w - r - eg'(e) < 0. Combining this with 
step 2) we have
r(e - 1) - eg'(e) < 0 .
3ZUsing (12), we then know that < 0.de
a1
3Z dZ jStep 4) If — > 0 and ^ r— < 0 it is now easy to check that I ax' >0. (Where dw de de =o
dw
I ax is described in equation (18)). de I—=o
dw
a2
Addendum to Chapter 2 
Appendix 1
I will here show that MLRP implies that E a [x I vv2 a (*)] ^
Ef i x  1 w2a(x^
Assumptions:
I  ^ fa&)_ | s |ncreasing in x  (MLRP1 xe R+ (A l.l)
To prove Proposition A l.l we will use the following lemma, which is proven 
afterwards. Although we shall use the lemma only for the case when the probability 
density h(x) has its entire mass on x  e R+, we formulate it more generally.
Lemma A l.l :  Let h(x), -«> < x < <», be a probability density , i.e. h(x)>0 and
h(x)dx = 1 . Then it holds for u(x) and v ( jc) ,  -<» < x < <*>, which both are
2) Let A be a subset of R+ such that M x)d x  > 0.
xfi(x)dx
fi(x)dx
ie a,f5 (A 1.2)
Proposition A l.l: Given assumptions 1) and 2);
Ea[x I x  e A] > Ep[x I x  e A]. (A1.3)
o o
o o
non-negative and increasing that;
u(x)h(x)dxu(x)v(x)h(x)dx > v(x)h(x)dx (A 1.4)
a3
Proof o f Proposition A1.1: By (A 1.2) we have that
( I
M
Ea[x I x  e A] = I xfa(x)dx
UI
fdX)  /flto
i
dx
fpfx)dx
Using lemma A l.l with
h(x) = , —  for jceA, =0 for x$A
Iffi(x)dx
( I
increasing by (Al.l)
u(x) = x increasing
we get that;
Ja
fftx )dx
-  | j  xfj3(x)dxJ^j f a(x)dxj /  J  fp(x)dx = | J  f a(x)dxj Ep[x I x  e A]
a4
(A1.5)
(A 1.6)
The claim in proposition A l.l now follows from (A 1.5) and (A 1.6)
Proof o f Lemma A l.l:  Let h be as stated in Lemma A l.l.
Stepl: Let J(x;a) be the function that jumps from 0 to 1 in x=a. (J is a one-step 
function). (A1.4) holds for u(x)=J(x;a) and v(x)=J(x;b) (for arbitrary a and
£
'X
b). To prove this put H (jc) = I h(y)dy. It is readily checked that
f.
£
£
J(x;a)h(x)dx = 1 - H(a)
J(x\b)h(x)dx =1- H(b)
J(x;a)J(x\b)h(x)dx =1- H(max(a,b)).
The claim now follows from the above formulas and the following inequality.
1 - H(max(a,b)) > (1-H(max(a,b))) (l-H(min(a,b))) =
(1 -H(a))(l-H(b)).
a5
Step 2: Let x), U2 (x),..., uN (x) and v^jc), V2U),..., v^C*) be functions 
such that (A1.4) hold for every pair (ufic), vp(x)), y =1,2,...,A, p= l,2 ,...,M , 
and let c 1,C2,...,ciV and arbitrary non-negative numbers. Then
(A 1.4) holds for
N N
u(x) = 21 cyUy(x) and v(x) = 21 dpVp(x) 
y=l p= 1
Proof:
too N  M C°°
I u(x)v(x)h(x)dx = 21 X  cydp I Uy(x)vp(x)h(x)dx > (by assumption) 
^ - O O  y=l p= 1 J - 0 0
N M I f°° \ f °
21 X  cydp | |  My(jc)/i(jc)dlx I vf}(x)h(x)dx
y=l p= 1 |J-oo j \J-°°
j
00 ' N  \
21 CyU^x) \h(x)dx 
y=l J I.
°° ' M  \
X  </pVp(*)
p= l j
\r fI u(x)h(x)dx\[ I \) \\  v(x)h(x)dx End of proof.
Steps 1 and 2 yield that (A 1.4) holds for arbitrary non-negative, increasing step
N
functions u{x)  and v(x), i.e. functions of the type 21 C y J ( x ; a y ), C y >  0.
y= 1
Step 3: If (A1.4) holds for (m^Vj), (M2,V2),.-, (un,vn)... and if
u(x) = %m>00un(x) and v ( jc )  = ^ > O Q v n ( J t )  exist, then (A1.4) holds for m(jc)
and v(x). Proof is obtained by letting n-> <*> in the inequality
a6
foo I C°° \ I C°°
I un(x)vn(x)h(x)dx > I Mn(x)/*(x)dx I vn(x)h(x)dx
J - OO \ J - 0 0  I \ J - o o
The claim in lemma A 1.4 now follows from the fact that every non-negative, 
increasing function can be obtained as lim of a sequence of increasing step functions 
(approximation from below).
a7
Addendum to chapter 3
dUHere I will show that =— = 0 <=> J(qc) = U, (used at page 82)
dqc
v  = p U q r)E[J \qr] 
r + p X (q c)
(al)
where,
M q r) = #1  - F (qc)\
E[J\ =
f J(q)f(q)dq
I Aq)dq
Differentiating E[J\ qc\ with respect to qc we get,
dE[J\qc] _
-J(qc)fiq c) I f(q )d q  + flqc) | J(q)f(q)dq
1
L f(q )d q
-J(qc)f{qr ) J ( q r )E { J \q i]  _ -J(qr)f(qr) f f [ q r)E [ J \q ii
f  Mdq f 1 -F{qc) 1 -F(qc)Aq)dq
(a2)
a8
- m c)E[J\qc] - # 1  - + # 1
[1-F(<7C)]¥
< = >
{ -<tfl.qc)E lf  I <7j - <A/ (‘?cM<7c) +  0/('?c)£ [-/l<?c]} + pA(<?c)} +
0A<?c) p 0 [ l - F ( ?(. ) ] £ [ ^ (;]= O
<=>
i r /  «• , . ¥(qr)P m -F (q r)]E[J\qr]
- W(ctc)Mc) +  C------------- C--------^  = 0
' •+pA(?)
< = >
J { q )  P0[1~F(^ )]£ [J^ ] pA(gc)£ [J I^ ] L, 
r+pH.q^) r+pM qc)
